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From the time George Hill assumed the presidency of the American Tobacco 
Company in 1926 until his death in 1946, the company spent more money advertising 
Lucky Strikes than had ever before been spent on a single product. During Hill’s 
tenure, Americans bought more than 100 billion Lucky Strikes annually. Hill’s 
carefully engineered and innovative advertising campaigns integrated print, radio, 
public relations, and other forms of advertising to great success in the 1920s and 
1930s as the company sought out a mass audience. By World War II, however, the 
company changed strategies as it increasingly diversified its advertisements to reflect 
new conceptions of audience segmentation. This abandonment of a “great mass 
audience” approach paralleled changes in other cultural industries in this period, 
demonstrating the significance of advertising as part of the mid-century cultural 
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George Washington Hill was president of the American Tobacco Company 
(ATC) for twenty years. After dropping out of school to work as a laborer in a 
company warehouse in 1904, he rose through the ranks to become “the world’s 
greatest advertiser” by the time he died in 1946.
1
 Though his name was largely 
unknown to contemporaries (he was seldom interviewed or made public 
appearances), it was hard to miss the name Lucky Strike, the cigarette brand he 
devoted his life to selling. Lucky Strike dominated Hill’s life: he grew tobacco in his 
New York mansion, taped cartons to the windows of his car, and even named his two 
dachshunds “Lucky” and “Strike.” Visitors at his home and office who doubted his 
commitment to the brand were quickly corrected if they tried to light any other kind 
of cigarette in his presence; he had a habit of tossing any “offending” cigarettes out 
the window.
2
 George Hill could not be satisfied unless the rest of America was in 
love with Lucky Strike too. 
When Hill became president of the ATC in 1926 Americans were smoking 
around 30 billion cigarettes annually, about seventeen percent of which were Lucky 
Strike. Twenty years later this figure had jumped to 300 billion cigarettes, over a third 
of which were Lucky Strike.
3
 “The man largely responsible” one observer recalled, 
“was George Washington Hill.”
4
 As president, Hill spent over $250,000,000 
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advertising Lucky Strike, more than any other advertiser had ever spent on a single 
product before.
5
 Newspapers, magazines, radio, film, even exhibits at the 1939 
World’s Fair were fair game for Hill, and he filled them with many colorful and 
memorable Lucky Strike ads each year. But Hill did not just sign the checks for the 
company ad budget; he also had a hand in creating many of the campaigns and 
slogans that found their way on to Lucky Strike ads. “Hill has shown a genius for 
advertising and sales psychology,” one critic wrote, “which has forced recognition for 
himself as the most dynamic figure in the tobacco industry- which, in retrospect, is 
epical.”
6
 Even when he didn’t write or edit an ad, he personally approved each one 
before it was released. Copywriters and other employees who could not conform to 
his style of advertising quickly found themselves out of a job.   
During Hill’s time as president, the ATC created and employed a complex 
advertising strategy to improve sales of Lucky Strike. It sought to capture the 
attention of American consumers and turn them into loyal customers. The methods 
the company used to promote Lucky Strikes demonstrate how they viewed the 
American public and what the best ways to motivate it were. Lucky Strike advertising 
went through major changes in this period, and reflects the larger changes that took 
place within the company and in American society at large. American Tobacco 
thought that it used effective advertising strategies, as demonstrated by the amount of 
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resources they put into advertising and the record-breaking sales figures they believed 
was the result.   
Lucky Strike advertising that was created before World War II was 
characterized by a desire to centralize and consolidate advertising as much as 
possible. Beginning with print media campaigns in the 1920s (the dominant medium 
of advertising at the time), Lucky Strike ads were all purposely unified under a single 
theme- modernity. Though the images, copy, and topics of ads regularly changed over 
the years, this underlying theme was always present. When radio came onto the 
advertising scene in the late 1920s, American Tobacco quickly recognized the 
unifying abilities the new mass medium had to offer. Millions of dollars were spent 
developing radio campaigns that tried to unify listeners with messages of national 
identity and mass consumption. A unified audience, the company believed, would be 
more responsive to a unified sales message. American Tobacco also explored other 
non-traditional sites of advertising such as product placement in films and public 
relations campaigns that turned the news into advertising propaganda as well. These 
“alternative” forms of advertising were unifiers as well. American Tobacco used them 
to integrate or “intertextualize” all types of Lucky Strike advertising together to form 
more persuasive advertisements that all reinforced each other. Under Hill’s direction, 
American Tobacco used each of these unique mediums to centralize their advertising 
message and target audience. 
American Tobacco’s attempts to unify themes in Lucky Strike advertising and 
their potential customers reveal how they viewed American consumer society. They 
envisioned their customers as members of a single mass audience, a central nucleus of 
consumers that were all motivated to act in the same way. In the early 20
th
 century 
many advertisers believed in the existence of what Jackson Lears has called “a child 
like mass audience” that could be manipulated with creative advertising that appealed 
to their longings and desires.
7
 American Tobacco’s advertising was targeted towards 
this “mass audience” demographic- a well-to-do urban audience that looked and felt 
modern. If consumers did not fit this description, Lucky Strike advertising tried to 
persuade them that by buying Luckies they would become a part of the mass 
American audience. In the years leading up to World War II, this strategy dominated 
Lucky Strike advertising in every medium. 
Equally important to American Tobacco’s vision of a great mass audience was 
its unquestionable whiteness. Lucky Strike ads created before the Second World War 
clearly stated the racial qualifications of their mass audience by omitting and ignoring 
consumers of color. From the model smokers drawn on print ads to the celebrities 
who endorsed the brand in radio and film, Lucky Strike was advertised before World 
War II as a cigarette exclusively for white smokers. Racial diversity was hidden from 
American Tobacco’s advertising campaigns and it is clear that the company only 
associated negative qualities with people of color despite the fact that millions of 
them smoked regularly. Though this thesis will not discuss racial representations in 
Lucky Strike advertising before World War II in depth, it is important to note that the 
omission of diversity makes race an important part of Lucky Strike’s history. 
American Tobacco’s belief in a mass audience did not last Hill’s entire career. 
As the Second World War created new challenges in manufacturing and advertising, 
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the company began to explore new strategies in order to shield themselves from 
material shortages and an American public struggling to adapt to life in wartime. In 
the months after the United States entered the war, Lucky Strike advertising began to 
fragment into campaigns that appealed to the consumer public in radically different 
ways. At this time, American Tobacco began to realize that there was not a single 
mass audience buying Lucky Strikes, and that different kinds of advertising appeals 
could be used simultaneously and result in high sales. When Hill died a year after the 
war’s end, over 100 billion Lucky Strikes were sold in the United States alone, a 




Despite the numerous innovations that George Hill pioneered and developed 
in his quest to sell Lucky Strikes, he remains fairly elusive to historians. The only 
discussions about Hill or Lucky Strike are brief and not comprehensive for this entire 
period. Nonetheless, there are a number of important works that engage with the 
some of the same arguments found in this thesis. Since the 1970s advertising histories 
have fallen into two main groups that place advertising in between business and 
cultural history. The first approaches advertising agencies and their roles as business 
enterprises. These historians fit advertising into a complex social, cultural, and 
economic system made up of changing marketing strategies, new relationships 
between business and the media, and advances in distribution systems. In 1976, Stuart 
Ewen’s Captains of Consciousness was the first to argue that ad men and other 
business leaders conspired to direct the buying habits, desires, and worldviews of the 
public once distribution, rather than production, became a critical problem of 
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 For a comparison of sales by cigarette brand, see Figure 1. 
capitalism. Advertisers like Hill encouraged Americans to adopt a whole new culture 
of consumption that went beyond the mere purchase of certain products.
9
 Michael 
Schudson, while perceptive of the coercive power of advertising, has made the case 
for a more complex relationship between manufacturers and advertising agencies, and 
that advertising is just one factor in successful marketing.
10
 Similarly, American 
Tobacco had complex (and often strained) associations with advertisers, publicists, 
industrial designers, and other agents they contracted with. Although it is out of the 
scope of this thesis, other factors such as pricing, distribution, and executive 
organization were also important factors in the success of the Lucky Strike brand and 
its impact on society. In recent years Inger Stole has contributed to this school of 
thought by exploring the relationships between public and private propaganda during 
World War II. She argues that the advertising industry maintained a “symbiotic” 
relationship with the federal government to protect itself from regulation and promote 
wartime consumption of consumer goods.
11
  
In his 1990 work, New and Improved, Richard Tedlow added to the “business 
enterprise” approach by analyzing the battles between soft drink and automobile 
manufacturers, grocery stores, and mail-order companies to determine why branding 
and other marketing techniques gave certain companies a competitive advantage in 
the late 19
th




 Similarly, Stefan Schwarzkopf has also 
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carefully researched the development of branding in the early 20
th
 century and argued 
that advertising agencies discovered the emotional and symbolic qualities of brands 




The second significant analytical dimension of recent advertising history, 
enriched by gendered and racial perspectives, is more cultural in focus. Dealing with 
subcultures of advertising men, their interactions and relationships with 
manufacturers, and their connections with larger cultural trends, this second school 
complements the first by placing advertising within the context of American culture. 
One of the most influential histories of advertising has been Roland Marchand’s 
Advertising the American Dream. In this 1985 work, Marchand explores the concept 
of “modernity,” which advertisers used to promote a new vision of American society 
in the early 20
th
 century where the consumption of goods solved the problems of 
modern life. Like Schudson, Marchand asserts that advertisers leveraged changes in 
American society to their advantage, but were not the creators or shapers of this new 
consumer society. 
14
 Another benchmark cultural history of advertising is Jackson 
Lears’ Fables of Abundance, which also assigns national advertisers a dominant role 
in shaping modern consumer culture in somewhat the same way Ewen did earlier. 
Lears views advertising in the early 20
th
 century as a “magical” force that influenced 
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consumers with imagery of abundance and modernity.
15
 In recent decades, historians 
like Jason Chambers have also begun to examine advertising’s impact on racial 
attitudes in American culture. In his 2008 work, Madison Avenue and the Color Line, 
he reveals the perilous relationship that African Americans have had with the 
advertising industry. In his analysis of the struggle for dignified portrayals of African 
Americans in ads, he places these people’s efforts inside the larger context of African 





Pamela Liard has attempted to connect the business and cultural sides of 
advertising history together by concentrating her research on the design, production, 
and distribution of advertisements. Using cultural analysis and examining the 
evolution of the institution of advertising between 1860 and 1920, her book 
Advertising Progress argues that as advertising became professionalized at the turn of 
the century, admen defined “progress” as the accumulation of consumer goods in an 
effort to bring individuals away from older modes of consumption. Like other 
historians Laird points to large national manufacturers like American Tobacco as the 
pioneers of marketing and advertising innovations.
17
 In the same spirit, this thesis will 
attempt to unite the business and cultural pieces of advertising studies in order to 
reveal the relationship between Lucky Strike advertising and American culture. 
The story of the American Tobacco Company during the George Hill years 
also is one of a national manufacturer that sought to be a source of cultural authority 
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and an active participant in the formation of a modern consumer culture. This thesis 
will try to add to the characterizations of the advertising industry in the early 20
th
 
century by adding two important concepts: the advertiser’s belief (or disbelief) in a 
mass audience and the importance of different mediums of advertising. Analyzing 
these concepts is essential to understanding of Lucky Strike advertising, and will 
feature heavily in the chapters of this thesis. I hope to demonstrate why George Hill 
and American Tobacco believed these underlying principles were so important in 
successful advertising.  
In Chapter One I will discuss the ways in which American Tobacco 
centralized their advertising strategies around the Lucky Strike brand after George 
Hill became company president. Print was the dominant medium of advertising up 
until the early 1930s, and was the only significant type of advertising the company 
used when Hill assumed control of the company. Lucky Strike advertising was 
centralized around the single theme- adapting to modernity. Though each ad 
campaign would look fresh and new, but it still adhered to the same basic theme and 
concepts, that buying Lucky Strike would help a consumer live a more modern 
lifestyle. The company’s decision to consolidate all Lucky Strike advertising under 
this single theme is evidence for their belief in a mass audience that would respond 
best to the same unchanging message. 
Chapter Two explores “alternative” forms of advertising; mediums that were 
not traditionally used by advertisers in the early 20
th
 century. George Hill invested 
significant resources into creating public relations events, developing an extensive 
product placement campaign in Hollywood films, and maintaining an exhibit at the 
1939 New York World’s Fair. These advertising mediums were often far less 
noticeable than other more traditional types like print or radio, but came to serve an 
important role in the overall Lucky Strike advertising strategy. Alternative advertising 
was designed to “intertextualize” or integrate different types of advertising together, 
so different Lucky Strike ads would connect and reinforce each other. These 
alternative advertising campaigns are also clear evidence of American Tobacco’s 
attempts to manipulate American culture and society to make it more of a 
homogenous mass audience. Actively creating a mass audience of pro-cigarette 
consumers, they believed, would make all Lucky Strike advertising more effective. 
Chapter Three discusses radio- another medium of advertising that American 
Tobacco used to create a more unified mass audience. Hill was a pioneer of the 
sponsored radio show- a broadcasting format that gave the advertiser complete 
control over the advertising and entertainment portions of each show. As a result, the 
ATC was actively creating popular American culture and imbedding their advertising 
messages and beliefs directly into every aspect of the show. Lucky Strike programs 
consciously encouraged listeners to think of themselves as a unified American 
audience, eliminating any regional or local differences. This nationalist rhetoric was 
built into the songs, announcements, and advertisements in each episode of popular 
shows like Your Hit Parade and Kay Kyser’s Kollege. American Tobacco’s adoption 
of radio also allowed them to spend their advertising budget more efficiently, and 




Finally, Chapter Four examines the collapse of the unified Lucky Strike 
advertising campaigns during World War II. Wartime shortages and the migration of 
Americans around the country and overseas radically changed consumer society and 
forced American Tobacco to overcome new issues. As a result, Lucky Strike 
advertising began to fragment. Different campaigns targeted Americans with 
inherently different types of appeals, and demonstrate that the company was 
beginning to realize that a mass audience did not exist. Instead, the ATC used some 
advertisements that contained idealized (and unrepresentative) pictures of American 
life in wartime, and others that seemed to recognize the real impact that the war had 
on individuals and groups. The ATC realized that consumer society was better 
persuaded to act through advertisements that appealed to target groups around the 
same time that the concept of a “mass American audience” were being disproven in 
other industries. 
At the end of George Hill’s life Lucky Strike was the most popular cigarette 
brand in the United States, and advertising had played a large part in this. Without 
Hill’s dynamic leadership after his death in 1946, the company diversified into other 
cigarette brands and Lucky Strike slowly faded into obscurity within a few decades. 
This thesis will investigate the American Tobacco Company before Hill’s death and 
the decline of Lucky Strike and analyze the strategies the company used to make the 
brand to successful in this period. 
 
 
Chapter 1: “He Makes America Sit Up and Buy:” Lucky Strike 
Print Advertising, 1926-1940 
It was a cold day in January, 1926 when George Washington Hill stepped into 
the President’s Office of the American Tobacco Company. The room was familiar to 
him, it had been occupied by his father, Percival Hill, for thirteen years until his death 
the previous December, and the two had spent many hours in there together keeping 
the company alive as rival companies threatened to bankrupt them. George had just 
been chosen as new president by the board of trustees, and knew that American 
Tobacco would need to radically alter its business plan if it was to compete with rival 
tobacco firms. For years now, the company had been slipping further and further 
behind R.J. Reynolds and Liggett & Myers, competitors who had been making 
enormous profits with their new cigarette brands: Camel and Chesterfield. These 
brands had been introduced and heavily advertised in the early 1910s and quickly 
captured the tobacco market at the expense of American Tobacco, even though the 
ATC sold dozens of brands of cigarettes, cigars, and loose tobacco blends. Even the 
creation of the Lucky Strike brand (in 1917)  was not enough to stop American 
Tobacco’s decline, even though the cigarette had been designed and manufactured 
using identical processes as Camel cigarettes.
18
 If American Tobacco was going to 
make any progress under George Hill’s leadership, it was clear that radical new 
changes were needed.  
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 After World War I, the smoking habits of the American public shifted away 
from cigars and chewing tobacco, and towards cigarettes. Once considered to be the 
“poor man’s tobacco,” the cigarette was a cheaper smoke that could be carried and 
used quickly. Advances in manufacturing in the late 19
th
 century allowed cigarettes to 
be manufactured by machine, and soon companies like American Tobacco were able 
to produce them by the billions, in much larger volume than other tobacco products. 
As the lives of Americans became increasingly mobile and fast-paced in the 1920s, 
cigarettes became more popular and tobacco manufacturers took notice.
19
 At 
American Tobacco, the Lucky Strike brand soon became their largest and most 
popular cigarette, and was a personal favorite of George Hill.  
 While he was an ATC junior-executive, George Hill was present when his 
father developed the first Lucky Strike advertising campaign.  At a 1916 meeting in 
the President’s Office, George mentioned that the new Lucky Strike cigarette 
contained tobacco that was heated and cooked by machinery to give it a pleasant 
aroma. A subordinate responded that Hill’s comment reminded him of the toast he 
had for breakfast and Percival instantly realized that this idea could be used for 
advertising the cigarette. “That is it,” he exclaimed, “it is toasted.”
20
 Here was a way 
to make Lucky Strike stand out from other brands. Advertisements featuring the 
slogan “It’s Toasted” accompanied Lucky Strike at its release in 1917, and helped the 
brand capture about ten percent of the American cigarette market. Success was not to 
follow however, as Lucky Strike failed to make significant gains on Camel and 
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Chesterfield, who still dominated the market. When George took the company’s reins 
in 1926, it was clear that a change in advertising was needed.  
 One of the most important changes in Lucky Strike advertising was the 
adoption of unifying theme- modernity. Though the subject matter and imagery of 
advertisements might change wildly from one year to the next, the underlying notion 
that Lucky Strikes were modern cigarettes always remained. The standard definition 
of modernity in advertising in this period has been argued most forcefully by Roland 
Marchand in Advertising the American Dream. Marchand contended that “modern” 
meant promoting “new urban habits” that were characteristic of the present day. It 
was also important to him that these ideas were communicated to the consuming 
public with an individual tone that denied the impersonal nature of 20
th
 century 
industry and economies of scale.
21
  But in many ways, American Tobacco’s vision of 
“modernity” was not just about identifying what was new, fashionable, and 
progressive; it was about deciding who belonged in this modern society and who did 
not. 
 By imbuing Lucky Strikes with certain qualities, they became a bridge for the 
consumer to cross from a backwards, pre-modern world and into a modern way of life 
that was wholly positive. Lucky Strikes helped the overweight become slender and 
the ordinary become glamorous. It helped smokers feel more refined and stylish. 
American Tobacco used modernity to act as a gate-keeper in American popular 
society. Modernity was a tool to welcome the “right” consumers- mostly urban, upper 
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and middle-class whites to their new community and exclude anyone else who did not 
fit in. Lucky Strike ads invoked advanced science, the popularity of film and stage 
stars, and other qualities of contemporary popular culture in order to appear modern. 
And by doing so, the ATC implied that consumers who did not smoke Luckies were 
not included in modern society. 
Advertising in newspapers, magazines, billboards, and other printed mediums 
was the most common form of advertising in the 1920s when George Hill became 
president. A visual combination of slogans, images, and advertising copy, printed ads 
gave the ATC the opportunity to appeal to potential customers both in public and at 
home. A further advantage that this advertising medium offered was that they could 
be modified quickly. Printed ads were temporary, the materials they were printed on 
were not meant to be kept permanently. As a result, Lucky Strike advertisements 
could be quickly adjusted whenever needed without worry that many older, out-
moded ads were still circulating. Changing the appearance and content of Lucky 
Strike to react to changes in American society rapidly helped the ATC keep its 
cigarettes fresh in the reading public’s mind. The ubiquitousness of printed material 
in American society meant that these advertisements could be the solution to the 
ATC’s problems… if the company was able to create effective advertising themes 
and strategies.  
 The beginning of Hill’s efforts to change Lucky Strike advertising and turn 
brand’s fortunes around (and the entire company with it) began when the ATC hired 
the services of the Lord & Thomas advertising agency. Albert Lasker, the head of this 
agency, was considered one of the fathers of modern advertising and had been in the 
business since the late 1890s. Lasker was known for a technique called “reason-why” 
advertising, that offered customers a concrete reason why they should buy a particular 
product or brand. Lasker thought that advertising should function in the same way as 
a salesman would in conversation with a consumer. “Instead of general claims, pretty 
pictures, or jingles,” one advertising historian later commented, Lasker thought “an 
ad should offer a concrete reason why the product was worth buying.”
22
 Lasker’s 
advertising was created for an audience that was “uneducated but not stupid,” easy to 
understand with appeals made by rational and sensible arguments.
23
 “We saw more 
clearly than ever than it is copy that makes advertising pay,” Lasker wrote in 1926, a 
year after he took on American Tobacco as a client, revealing his emphasis on the 
message over emotional imagery in advertising.
24
 Treating advertisements as 
“salesmanship-in-print” and the reason-why philosophy was the means through which 
Lasker believed products appealed to consumers. These techniques did not just 
inform readers about a product; they actively imbued brands with desirable qualities 
and enhanced their public image.  
 Hill’s first major change at the American Tobacco Company as president was 
to concentrate exclusively on the Lucky Strike brand. The old company policy of 
spending equal time and attention on the dozens of different products the ATC sold 
made it difficult to create strong, unified advertising campaigns. Hill had advocated 
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 Lord & Thomas was originally hired by Percival Hill to work on a minor smoking tobacco 
brand called Blue Boar. After boosting the brand’s sales significantly in a short amount of time, he 
caught the attention of George Hill, at the time a vice-president of sales. When Hill came to power a 




for this change before he was president, but had not been able to convince the 
company that this was a good idea. Writing that “you can’t survive unless you have 
one brand,” Lasker agreed, “because 80 or 90 percent of the cigarette business in this 
country today is on this one type of cigarette.” Arguing that other the ATC should 
think of their other tobacco products as different types of goods entirely, he 
continued: “instead of spending…a moderate amount of money on each of these 
products, milk them all. Take what you spend on them and the milking of their profits 
and put it in a big push behind Luckies.”
25
 Hill also centralized the management 
organization of the ATC, moving independent managers off of other brands and 
making them district managers for Lucky Strike. When Hill launched unified 
advertising campaigns nationally, he needed a “single, flexible and compact 
organization” to implement them.
26
 
 Along with American Tobacco’s decision to focus its time and resources on 
the Lucky Strike brand came a change in the company’s advertising. Though Albert 
Lasker was a professional advertiser and in charge of the Lucky Strike account, he 
still had to work with the indefatigable President Hill, who had more than a few of his 
own ideas about successful advertising. Fortunately, the two men agreed on many of 
the fundamentals like salesmanship-in-print and reason-why advertising. Learning 
from the initial success of the “Its Toasted” slogan in 1917, Hill believed that a good 
advertisement took a recognizable element from a product and then stressed it in copy 
and visuals. “We must first find some particular quality or tangible attribute, that is a 
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26
 Allen, “He Makes America Sit Up and Buy,” 14. 
part of our actual product,” he wrote in a 1917 essay, and “this tangible information 
will give a foundation on which to build a message to be presented through all 
advertising.”
27
 In this regard, Hill’s fundamental approach to advertising was very 
similar to Lasker’s. Both believed in concentrating advertising on a single product 
and a single message (or theme) for the product. 
 Hill and Lasker did not agree on everything, however. As one of his 
copywriters later recalled, Lasker “aimed at an appeal to reason and intelligence 
rather than the time-honored assumption that the public was a mass of dumb, driven 
sheep, which could be swayed with mere picture-and-catch-word.”
28
 Hill, on the other 
hand, would often insist on using the large, flashy pictures and slogan that Lasker 
disliked. Though they both agreed that Lucky Strike needed a coherent theme, the 
two would constantly clash on the appearance and content in ad copy over the years. 
In his office, Hill and Lasker “often spent hours on a single piece of copy, blue 
penciling here, underlining there, changing a word, sharpening a headline.”
29
 The 
advertisements that emerged from this revision process were a synthesis of Lasker’s 
rational arguments in ad copy and the sensational (sometimes even startling) images 
and slogans that Hill favored.
30
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 When Albert Lasker began working on the Lucky Strike account, George Hill 
had him build off of the existing “Its Toasted” slogan instead of creating a new one. 
Though it had proven popular at the start, years of repetition had dulled its 
effectiveness. Customers needed a convincing reason why Lucky Strike was not just a 
good product on its own, but was in fact superior to other brands. Before George Hill 
became ATC president, the only advertised merits of the toasting process were that it 
“added enjoyment” and that it developed “hidden flavors.”
31
 A vague claim that did 
little to separate Lucky Strike from other comparable brands, Lasker advised that the 
ATC freshen up the concept of toasting with what one historian has called “the 
trappings of scientific legitimacy.”
32
 After some deliberation and many hours of 
revision in his office, Hill’s first Lucky Strike campaign did just that. 
 In 1927, new Lucky Strike advertisements were published featuring a series of 
testimonials from prominent singers from the opera and stage asserting that Lucky 
Strike was the favorite cigarette of performers who needed to protect their voices. 
“Singers must be cautious regarding their throats,” one testimonial read, “Like other 
singers, I prefer Lucky Strikes because they are never irritating and because of their 
finer flavor.”
33
 Advertising claims had expanded out of the realm of taste and now 
claimed that the technologically advanced toasting process actually improved a 
consumer’s health. Alongside the familiar “Its Toasted” slogan, a new phrase 
appeared in large underlined letters- “Your Throat Protection,” suggesting that the 
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toasting process now actively protected a smoker’s health as well. For the first time, 
the ATC used modernity in their advertising to make the claim that Lucky Strike was 
more than just a good cigarette. Because of its modern qualities, ads asserted, it was 
actually superior to other brands on the market. 
 By using the concept of modernity, Lucky Strike advertising tried to separate 
itself from other cigarettes. Lucky Strike was a symbol of leisure, good health, and 
good taste- all attributes of the ATC vision of modernity. Suggesting that other brands 
that were not toasted did not have these positive qualities, the ATC made it clear that 
they were inferior and would not make consumers more modern.  
 Along with overt allusions to modernity and the benefits of technological 
progress, the Precious Voice campaign was significant because it was the first 
cigarette campaign to include women in its target audience. “We never dared talk 
about women smoking cigarettes, until…we had a series of testimonials of opera 
singers, and among others was Madame Schumann-Heink,” George Hill later 
recounted, “she was the first woman that ever publically came out and testified that 
she smoked cigarettes.”
34
 Before the Precious Voice campaign, depictions of women 
in advertising only subtlety suggested that they could and should smoke. Other brands 
had advertisements that could be interpreted as friendly to women in the mid 1920s, 
with slogans like Marlboro’s “As Mild as May” and Chesterfield’s images of women 
romantically gazing at their cigarette-puffing beaus.
35
 However, women were never 
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actually depicted smoking. They merely implied that the women in these ads desired 
men who smoked, and that if they did actually smoke, it was done privately in the 
home, away from the public eye. 
 But subtle suggestions did not suit George Hill, nor did they follow Lasker’s 
reason-why method. Women had been buying cigarettes in increasing numbers since 
the First World War, and by the late 1920s were smoking millions annually.
36
 Due to 
rigid social norms, however, women were traditionally barred from smoking in 
public. According to one report from 1927, New York City women would hire taxis 
or hide out in beauty parlors for the sole purpose of enjoying their cigarette without 
the scrutiny that came with it in the public sphere.
37
 Lasker experienced this taboo 
personally when his wife Mary was chastised by a waiter and ordered to stop when 
she lit up in a restaurant, a surprise to the couple who regularly smoked together at 
home.
38
 Observing that many women already wanted to smoke, Hill realized that this 
was an opportunity to double the numbers of Lucky Strike customers, and all he 
needed was an effective advertising campaign. Hill became convinced that the 
testimonial of opera singers and other well-known female performers were the key to 
attracting the smoking woman’s attention, and quickly hired a number of celebrities 
such as actresses Helen Hayes and Constance Talmadge, and Ziegfeld Folly Myrna 
Darby to endorse Lucky Strikes. With their endorsements, smoking was advertised as 
sophisticated, feminine, and modern as the flappers that epitomized the decade. 
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 By using testimonials, Hill and Lasker were following another larger trend 
seen in the advertising industry in the late 1920s. At the time, many felt that 
testimonials helped give ads a more personal and modern feel.
39
 The influence of 
mass American culture intensified in the years after World War I, aided by the spread 
of nationally distributed films and other popular publications. For new generation of 
Americans who had grown up with movies and mass popular culture as a part of their 
daily lives, film stars and similar celebrities gained enormous authority and influence. 
“Our children,” claimed the cultural critic Norman Richardson in 1921, “are rapidly 
becoming what they see in the movies.”
40
 These children were young adults with 
purchasing power by the end of the decade and Hill hoped that a testimonial from a 
respected actress would help make smoking acceptable for women. Stanley Resor, 
president of the J. Walter Thompson advertising firm argued at the time that 
Americans had demonstrated time and time again that they wanted their information, 
news, and entertainment conveyed through personalities or celebrities. He further said 
that Americans have always been in an eternal “search for authority,” which led them 
revere and respect whoever would best fill the traditional role of the aristocracy that 
the United States lacked.
41
 After the initial success of the Precious Voice campaign in 
1927, American Tobacco continued to use testimonials from Americans prominent in 
many fields to advertise Lucky Strikes to men and women. 
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 Star culture became a critical piece of the definition of modernity that 
American Tobacco imparted on Lucky Strike. As Americans continued to distance 
themselves from older Victorian emphasis on one’s character and instead focused on 
personality, celebrities became a central figure in society. Through radio, national 
media publications, and especially film, Americans were constantly exposed to 
unordinary people whose special characteristics stood out from the rest of mass 
society. Radio and cinema’s association with modern life made their celebrities clear 
representations of the modern “culture of personality,” which in turn were co-opted 
by the ATC to imbue Lucky Strike with a sense of modernity and authority.
42
  
 Along with the sales boost that was attributed to the new Lucky Strike 
advertising in Hill’s opening years as president, the Precious Voice campaign and 
subsequent testimonial campaigns also created a significant amount of criticism and 
negative publicity. Ernestine Schumann-Heink, the first woman to endorse Lucky 
Strike (or for that matter any cigarette) publically soon after recanted her testimony 
and claimed that it was obtained through dubious means.
43
 Often times it was 
revealed that celebrities were paid by American Tobacco for their testimony and often 
did not smoke Luckies, and sometimes did not even smoke at all.
44
 Government 
investigation later revealed that Lasker had written to thousands of doctors asking if 
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quoted in Marchand, 100 
they would sample a Lucky Strike cigarette and agree that that toasting process made 
it the least irritating brand to the throat. Doctors that responded favorably to Lucky 
Strike were given five free cartons of the cigarettes, and the ATC was able to publish 
ads that claimed “20,679 Physicians Say ‘Luckies are less irritating.”
45
  By the end of 
the 1920s, testimonials from sources of authority over-saturated print advertising and 
lost much of the respect it had with consumers.
46
  As early as 1926, the advertising 
journal Printer’s Ink declared that “all testimonial is faked,” and later reported that a 
majority of consumers thought “the use of purchased testimonials is [not] good for 
advertising in general.”
47
 But, the ATC was seeing results as they continued to 
advertise modernity with paid testimonials and questionable health claims in Lucky 
Strike. 
 Regardless of any irritation Lucky Strike advertising caused in consumers, 
sales surged as ads continued to link the cigarette to the theme of modernity. In many 
ways, Hill’s approach to advertising resembled the infamous “confidence men” (con 
man) of the 19
th
 century- the swindlers and medicine peddlers who sold goods to an 
unsuspecting public through deception.
48
 Conmen made the sale of commodities a 
performance with captivating movements, actions, and language designed to 
transform an ordinary object into one with magical qualities or powers. By fetishizing 
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their wares, conmen brought the wonders of modernity to the consuming public.
49
 
Hill and Lasker gave the 19
th
 century conman a 20th century update in their Lucky 
Strike campaigns. Instead of captivating the public with magic, Lucky Strike used 
science and the testimonials from authority to associate a banal product with 
extraordinary modern qualities. Though this was a new version of the confidence 
man, the use of these basic concepts- showmanship, product association with 
extraordinary value, and the appearance of a personal relationship between buyer and 
seller- demonstrate how American Tobacco chose to make Lucky Strikes modern. 
 The controversy and irritation that Lucky Strike advertising created in the late 
1920s was no concern to George Hill. Publicity and discussion, whether it was 
positive or negative, was Hill’s ultimate goal. Since thousands of current Lucky 
Strike smokers, salesmen, and retailers were spread across the United States, 
captivating advertisements gave people a reason to think about Lucky Strike and 
discuss it with their peers. When this conversation started, the ATC hoped, potential 
customers would be persuaded that Lucky Strike was a superior brand in a personal 
way. According to Hill, the print advertisement was the spark that would initiate 
discussion among consumers which would then convince them to buy Lucky Strike 
(See Figure 1).
50
 Keeping Luckies in the news, regardless of the tone of the story, 
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would sell cigarettes. Citing the surge in sales that accompanied these testimonial 
campaigns, Hill met with more admen in his ATC office again in 1928 to prepare for 
a new advertising campaign that would take the successful elements of the Precious 
Voice advertisements, and extend them even further.  
 Unfazed by the criticism of testimonials and dubious claims in Lucky Strike 
advertisements, Hill worked with Lasker to continue using technological progress, 
celebrity endorsement, and the New Woman to associate Luckies with modernity. In 
the months since Lucky Strike began directly targeting women in 1927, observers 
remarked that the taboo against women smoking in public had been significantly 
weakened.
51
 And in 1928, slimness was added to the list of modern qualities that the 
cigarettes claimed to have in a new campaign with a new slogan for Lucky Strike: 
“Reach for a Lucky.”  
 According to company lore, Hill created the Reach for a Lucky campaign 
after a chance observation he made on the streets of New York City. “I was riding out 
to my home, and I got to 110
th
 street and Fifth Avenue; I was sitting in the car and I 
looked at the corner, and there was a great big stout lady chewing gum. And there 
was a taxicab…coming the other way,” Hill recalled. “There was a young lady in the 
taxicab with a long cigarette holder in her mouth, and she had a very good figure. But 
right then and there it hit me,” he continued, “there was the lady that was stout and 
chewing, and there was the young girl that was slim and smoking a cigarette.”
52
 It 
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was at that moment that a catchy phrase entered George Hill’s mind: “Reach for a 
Lucky Instead of a Sweet.” 
 Other accounts of this origin story credit Albert Lasker with the actual 
creation of this slogan, and others even credit the two with creating the slogan 
simultaneously and independently.
53
 Regardless of which men had the original idea, 
Hill immediately approved the slogan and made it the new selling point in Lucky 
Strike advertising. The bulk of American Tobacco’s advertising budget was thrown 
behind the new campaign. “Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet” suggested that 
Lucky Strikes were a healthy alternative to candy and other unhealthy foods. Similar 
to the Precious Voice campaign, here was another reason-why argument to convince 
ordinary women to smoke Luckies, and to smoke them more often. Lucky Strike was 
advertised as a product that could help consumers be more “modern,” combining 
health concerns, slimness, and “female vanity” together in a single slogan.
54
 
 It is likely that the stout woman Hill encountered on the street was black. In 
some versions of his story, she is referred to as a “negro.” The intersection that Hill 
claimed the incident took place was on the edge of Harlem, a historically black 
neighborhood at the time. The negative associations that Hill assigned to the black 
chewing woman as opposed to the likely white woman in the taxi is one of the 
clearest examples of race’s place in the ATC’s vision of modernity. Although it was 
far from a perfect binary, blackness and whiteness were commonly viewed in 
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 From this origin story it is 
clear Hill believed that blackness was a sign of backwardness, and that it did not 
belong in a world with sophisticated and modern white consumers or Lucky Strike 
cigarettes. 
 In addition to these themes, Hill’s account of the “Reach for a Lucky Instead 
of a Sweet” origin reveals the socio-economic definitions of modernity that the ATC 
wanted to pair with Lucky Strike cigarettes. The intersection of 110
th
 street and Fifth 
Avenue was not in a wealthy or affluent part of the city like Hill’s office downtown.
56
 
The “stout lady” from Hill’s apocryphal story is on foot, and likely a member of the 
working class. She is not riding in a taxi, a symbol of modern urban life. Her chewing 
disgusts Hill, who is relieved to see a modern, well-to-do woman smoking a cigarette. 
The fact that this slim young woman was also using a cigarette holder, a mark of class 
and wealth, furthers the clear division of class between her and her chewing 
counterpart. Even if the validity of this story is suspect, the fact that Hill wrapped the 
differences between cigarettes and rival products in class-oriented imagery reveals an 
important dimension in Lucky Strike advertising strategies. 
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 Beginning in 1928, Lucky Strike advertisements appeared on billboards, 
newspapers, and magazines emblazoned with the slogan “Reach for a Lucky Instead 
of a Sweet.” The campaign continued to use paid testimonials from celebrities and 
scientific authorities, but the most striking feature of the new campaign was its use of 
“competitive copy-“ direct attacks on another brand or product.
57
 American Tobacco 
had stopped claiming that Lucky Strike was only the best cigarette, and now 
advertised that it was superior to other types of products as well. Focusing on the 
word “instead,” these new advertisements proposed that Lucky Strike was a modern 
alternative to candy. “Light a Lucky and you’ll never miss sweets that make you fat” 
claimed a 1929 testimonial from Constance Talmadge. After this shocking headline 
the body of the advertisement directly linked modernity to a person’s figure, claiming 
that “the smartest and loveliest women of the modern stage take this means of 
keeping slender… when others nibble fattening sweets, they light a Lucky.” The 
advertising copy also featured authoritative sounding advice that “a reasonable 
proportion of sugar in the diet is recommended, but the authorities are overwhelming 




 The Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet campaign targeted women much 
like the older Precious Voice testimonials had the previous year. Instead of throat 
protection, however, slenderness became the reason why Lucky Strike was a modern 
product. Candy, long associated with fat and weight gain, did not match the slender 
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 Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising. "Reach for a Lucky Instead of a 
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celebrities that graced the movie screen and pages of magazines. A slender body was 
a sign of health, just as excess weight was a visual confirmation that an individual 
was backwards. Lucky Strikes, American Tobacco argued, were necessary to meet 




 The decision to include competitive copy in Lucky Strike advertising shocked 
many Americans, especially the advertising industry. The advertising trade press 
responded that these antagonizing claims were destroying public trust in advertising 
and American business. Controversial advertising such as this, critics claimed, drew 
attention towards the advertising process rather than the products being sold.
60
 And 
the use of competitive copy, they warned, would spur retaliation from the candy 
industry as well. The critics were right. Angered by ads that claimed Luckies were “a 
delightful alternative for that craving for fattening sweets,” candy manufacturers 
released ads that called cigarettes poisonous and even fatal.
61
 According to one, 
Luckies were “nails in your coffin.”
62
 Criticism to new ads did not stop the ATC from 
using the “Reach for a Lucky” slogan. A few years later, Hill remarked that the 
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 As the advertising battle between American Tobacco and its critics raged, 
Lucky Strike sales rose at a meteoric rate. Selling fewer than 18 billion cigarettes in 
1927, the Precious Voice campaign had helped boost Lucky Strike sales but did not 
bring them near the numbers of Camels or Chesterfields sold. The next year, aided by 
the Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet slogan, over 40 billion Luckies were sold, 
putting them right behind Camel on the sales charts.
64
 That same year, the Federal 
Trade Commission began to investigate American Tobacco’s advertising practices. 
Pressured by lobbyists from the candy industry, FTC officials ordered the ATC not to 
buy any more testimonials from celebrities or to advertise Lucky Strikes as a weight-
loss alternative to candy.
65
 Forced to comply with the federal government, it seemed 
that George Hill had lost the ability to connect Lucky Strike to two important pieces 
of modernity.  
 But the FTC intervention was not the end of George Hill or Lucky Strike. 
New advertisements were quickly published by American Tobacco that promoted 
“moderation in all things” and simply encouraged Americans to “Reach for a Lucky.” 
Dropping all mentions of sweets or candy and maintaining a non-committal attitude 
towards Lucky Strike’s aid in weight loss, the new ads were able to subtly continue 
making the same weight-loss themes without violating any federal orders. In addition 
to the new slogan and copy, the “Reach for a Lucky” series featured what Roland 
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Marchand has called “visual blockbusters.” Images of slim and attractive young 
people were drawn with overweight and morbid looking shadows looming behind 
them.
66
 “Avoid that future shadow by refraining from overindulgence, if you would 
maintain that modern figure of fashion,” the ads advised, “when tempted reach for a 
Lucky instead.”
67
 Building off the notoriety of the earlier Lucky Strike ads, it was no 
secret that the theme and message remained unchanged from before. 
 The first four years of George Hill’s presidency at American Tobacco resulted 
in a flurry of controversial yet memorable ads. At their core, each advertisement in 
the “Precious Voice” testimonial series and both “Reach for a Lucky” weight-loss 
campaigns made the same assumptions about American consumers and modernity. 
Maintaining continuity in each new ad campaign allowed the ATC to build off 
previous claims and demonstrate Lucky Strike’s modern qualities in a variety of 
ways. By the end of the 1920s, the success of this advertising strategy had contributed 
to Lucky Strike’s rise to the top of the sales charts.
68
 In the 1930s, however, new 
challenges emerged from the onset of the Great Depression that put Lucky Strike 
advertising to the test. Despite increased consumer suspicions of advertising, 
decreased spending power from customers, and a destructive price war with 
competitors, American Tobacco continued to advertise Lucky Strike with the same 
techniques that had brought success in Hill’s early years.
69
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 Centralizing Lucky Strike advertising on the same theme and target audience 
helped American Tobacco sell more cigarettes, and at the same time allowed the 
company to actually reduce its total advertising expenditure. This would be critical to 
their success during the Great Depression. “I don’t believe I’m wrong in believing the 
power of the printed word is created in times of great sales resistance then when 
everything is rosy and people need not give such careful attention to the expenditure 
of every penny,” Hill quipped  in 1932- one of the darkest years of the Depression. 
“We are ourselves are going after the cigarette market harder than ever before,” he 
insisted, determined to convince Americans that Lucky Strike cigarettes were an 
essential part of modern life.
70
  
Throughout the decade, Lucky Strike ads continued to target women and use 
provocative or shocking copy to attract consumers. Other cigarette manufacturers 
were slow to include women in their ads and focused almost exclusively on health 
and price benefits instead.
71
 Hill’s aggressive style of advertising was also cheaper. In 
the 1930s American Tobacco spent less on advertising per cigarette sold than their 
rivals spent on Camel or Chesterfield. According to Neil Borden, an expert observer 
of the advertising industry, the effectiveness of Lucky Strike advertising techniques 
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 Though Lucky Strike advertising remained linked with the idea of modernity 
as it had in the 1920s, the images and copy that presented this theme would often 
change as Hill and other advertisers rapidly introduced and retired ad campaigns 
throughout the 1930s. Hill believed that “advertising of a…cigarette must be news 
and that even the best story wears out quickly after three months’ use.” Recalling the 
problems that Lucky Strike faced before he was president, Hill would never be 
allowed to become stale in the public’s mind, no matter what. “Ten weeks is his limit 
for a newspaper campaign,” one analyst said, “and he thinks a rest of equal length, 
during which consumers can speculate as to what Lucky Strike will do next, is 
advisable.”
73
 Hill wanted to serialize Lucky Strike’s connection with modernity: 
benefits to health, the slimming qualities of cigarettes, and association with popular 
authority figures. Once these themes were cemented in the public’s mind, he 
believed, successive ad campaigns would build off them while appearing new and 
exciting at the same time.
74
 
 While wide-spread public knowledge of the medical risks involved with 
smoking would not become available until the early 1960s, the American public was 
generally aware that cigarettes did pose some hazards and could irritate the throat and 
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lungs or leave a bitter aftertaste.
75
 This is reflected in the great efforts that American 
Tobacco (and other cigarette manufacturers) took to sell their brands as a “lighter 
smoke” that was easy on the throat. Evoking technical innovations and the expertise 
of doctors and other “experts,” Lucky Strike advertising continued to build off of the 
success of the “Precious Voice” and “Reach for a Lucky” campaigns and claim health 
benefits. Targeting Americans eager to fit into a healthy, attractive, and modern 
lifestyle, Hill approved a number of striking ad campaigns based on the links between 
personal health and modernity.  
 Responding to recent research indicating that exposure to ultra-violet rays led 
to health benefits (including resistance to disease), 1931 saw the first changes to the 
Lucky Strike production process since the brand’s birth in 1917.
76
  Using sun lamps 
to heat raw tobacco with ultra-violet rays, George Hill fabricated another modern 
innovation that would associate Lucky Strike with modernity and better health. That 
year, a series of new ads featuring slender and tanned women enjoying the sunny 
outdoors were published nationally in periodicals and outdoor advertisements.
77
 
Featuring the slogan “Sunshine Mellows- Heat Purifies,” these ads were able to 
continue promoting Lucky Strike as modern and respond to popular new trends at the 
same time. With the words “Sunshine Mellows,” the ad reminded readers that 
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sunlight provides many benefits and a healthy constitution. The second half of the 
slogan: “Heat Purifies” followed up this association by suggesting that the artificial 
light and heat created by ultra-violet rays actually improved on the sun’s benefits and 
purified and sanitized Lucky Strike tobacco more than natural processes (or any rival 
brand) ever could. At the bottom of each advertisement, the old slogan “Its Toasted” 
appeared prominently, to provide continuity to older Lucky Strike ads and claim that 
the toasting process was actually an important medical innovation.
78
 Keeping with 
their strategy of short advertising campaigns, this series was retired only a few 




 As the depression rolled on, George Hill’s commitment to aggressive 
advertising remained, and new advertisements continued to stir up the same 
connections to modernity that the “Precious Voice” and “Reach for a Lucky” 
campaigns had. Despite the best efforts of the ATC, the cigarette continued to suffer 
from association with ugliness in the 1930s. Clouds of smoke, coughing, unpleasant 
smells- these were not the key words of modernity in an American society 
increasingly concerned with sanitation and good health. One 1932 Lucky Strike 
campaign attempted maneuver around this difficulty by asking customers one 
question: “Do You Inhale?” Every smoker inhales their cigarette smoke, each ad in 
the series declared, so it is important to know that the ingredients in a cigarette are 
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clean and safe. “For years there has been generally a striking avoidance of the word 
‘inhale’ in cigarette advertising,” the copy continued, but thanks to the toasting 
process and ultra-violet light, Lucky Strike was not afraid to bring up the question.
80
  
 Responding to this new challenge to the cigarette industry, critics were quick 
to condemn the new ads as vulgar and frightening. “Now that Lucky Strikes have 
gone into the fear copy division,” one journal wrote in reply, “some of the more 
timorous souls are going to be afraid to breathe.”
81
 Discussing a subject long 
considered by the public to be taboo elicited responses similar to the “Reach for a 
Lucky Instead of a Sweet” ads from the late 1920s. And like the older ads, the “Do 
You Inhale?” campaign was followed by an increase in sales soon after.  
 Though most Lucky Strike ads were considered successful by the ATC and 
George Hill, the campaign released immediately after the “Do You Inhale?” series 
was ultimately seen as a failure. Featuring lions vibrant drawings of animals and 
people, Lucky Strike ads had a new message: “Nature in the Raw is Seldom Mild.” In 
these ads the forces of nature were personified as fearsome lions, savage warriors, 
and blood-thirsty Indians. On its own, nature was dangerous, often times fatal. “The 
fact is, we never overlook the truth that ‘Nature in the Raw is Seldom Mild,’” the ads 
read, “so these fine tobaccos, after proper aging and mellowing, are then given the 
benefit of that Lucky Strike purifying process.”
82
 American Tobacco’s modern 
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manufacturing techniques took any danger out of natural tobacco, and turned it into a 
safe and modern product.  
 While the “Nature in the Raw” series did continue to embrace the same vision 
of modernity as previous Lucky Strike advertising, George Hill later admitted that the 
ads were too abstract and difficult for the public to understand easily. The 
connections between modernity and Lucky Strike were not immediately apparent, nor 
did they incorporate medical/scientific authority or link the cigarette with popular 
celebrities. Having the modernity theme was not enough it seemed; advertising 
needed to use the same techniques and approaches that consumers expected. After 
sales of Lucky Strike dropped by several billion cigarettes that year, Hill called the 
campaign a “poor idea.”
83
 Learning from this experience, American Tobacco quickly 
returned with new campaigns that did a better job focusing on the modernity theme in 
a way that was easier for consumers to understand.  
 Learning from the failure of the “Nature in the Raw” series, American 
Tobacco tried to clearly link Lucky Strike advertising to past slogans that had 
improved sales. Romantic illustrations of couples in various settings highlighted the 
new campaign. There was no advertising copy, only slogans such as “Just One More” 
and “No More Need be Said.” These ads combined sexual allure with images of 
purity, beauty, and leisure as previous campaigns had in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Hill spared no expense on artwork, hiring such commercial artists as Hayden 
Hayden and Howard Chandler Christy to create characters who were sexually 
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 Readers could have easily mistaken these figures for Clark 
Gable, Claudette Colbert, or the other many celebrities who had appeared in Lucky 
Strike testimonial ads in the past.  
 As the 1930s drew to a close and the Great Depression began to wane, sales of 
Lucky Strike rose even higher than they had in Hill’s early years as president, a fact 
that he attributed to effective advertising strategies. In his first few years, Lucky 
Strike burst onto the national scene with advertising that captured the public’s 
attention and shocked them with direct appeals to women and claims that other 
products on the market were toxic and dangerous. These campaigns were the first to 
advertise Lucky Strike as an essential tool for Americans to maintain a modern 
lifestyle. Once sales and interest sales had been jump started with the “Precious 
Voice” and “Reach for a Lucky” campaigns, the company’s rapid-fire campaigns in 
the 1930s kept returning to the same proven theme of modernity without fail, milking 
it for all it was worth without appearing stale in the public eye.  
 The critical piece of the Lucky Strike advertising of this era was not simply 
that the cigarette was described as modern, but that all advertising that the American 
Tobacco Company created was centralized under this theme. In essence, the same 
message about Lucky Strike was being repeated over and over to Americans for close 
to fifteen years. George Hill and American Tobacco’s stubborn insistence on 
following this strategy, much to the chagrin of critics and competitors alike, was a 
result of their belief in a mass American audience that would respond best to 
advertising if it was uniform and consistent. Modernity was a malleable concept, and 
the ATC was able to manipulate it and associate it with Lucky Strike from many 
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different angles without changing the basic concept. But ultimately modernity was the 
tool that American Tobacco used to reach the mass American audience. Whenever 
Hill or even the ATC looked back on their advertising in the 1920s and 1930s, they 
always judged campaigns based on their ability to attract and persuade the mass 
audience that Lucky Strike was modern. The brand’s quick rise to popularity after 
Hill became president and its reliable high sales figures afterwards, they believed, 
was due to the mass audience’s response to their effective advertising. 
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Chapter 2: The Gospel of Smoke: Intertextuality among 
Mediums of Lucky Strike Advertising, 1927-1940 
 A common criticism of Lucky Strike advertising was that it was too blatant. 
From the repetitive sales messages on radio programs sponsored by the cigarette 
brand to the intrusive ads plastered across popular newspapers and magazines, it was 
difficult to avoid exposure to Lucky Strike advertising in the United States by the late 
1930s. “I am very much worked up over the fact that the cigarette people are 
employing the radio to broadcast information that tends to corrupt the morals of my 
little son,” one New York listener complained in 1931, “cigarettes, in my opinion, do 
enough harm as it is, without spending thousands of dollars to make the use of a 
blessing such as radio to spread the awful habit.”
85
 By itself, mass advertising through 
print and radio threatened to drive away the very consumers that American Tobacco 
was targeting. But radio and print were not the only methods the American Tobacco 
Company used in this period. Largely unbeknownst to the American public, Lucky 
Strike cigarettes were also advertised in a variety of alternative, or non-traditional, 
ways that attempted to sway the consumer publics’ opinions in subtle ways. When 
George Washington Hill became president of the American Tobacco Company in 
1926, cigarettes were still relatively new and not totally accepted by the American 
public. Women, rural Americans, members of the socio-economic elite, and a number 
of other demographic groups were restricted from purchasing cigarettes either by 
taboos enforced from within their own groups or from American society at large, 
placing serious restrictions on Lucky Strike and other domestic cigarette sales.  
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Along with print and radio, Lucky Strike was advertised to Americans through 
public relations, product placement, participation in public events, and other means 
that were not as noticeable or direct. These “alternative” advertising methods often 
times did not advertise Lucky Strike expressly. Instead they promoted general 
cigarette use or highlighted themes and feelings that traditional advertising associated 
with the brand. But what alternative forms of advertising lacked in 
straightforwardness they made up for by strengthening and intertextualizing print and 
radio ads. This process created a web of different types of advertising mediums that 
all corresponded to each other.  
 The strength of alternative advertising techniques lay in their ability to unify 
advertisements that were separated by location and communicated in intrinsically 
different ways. Instead of relying on print, radio, or an alternative form of advertising 
to persuade consumers to buy Luckies by itself, American Tobacco made different 
advertising mediums reinforce each other. Public relations, product placement in film, 
and public displays at events like the 1939 New York World’s Fair served to create a 
sophisticated and intertextual advertising system that consistently supported Lucky 
Strike simultaneously in different areas of American society. American Tobacco 
believed that if it could integrate these different mediums and incorporate them 
altogether into their advertising, then Americans would be more persuaded to buy 
Lucky Strikes. Though alternative forms of advertising was often subtle or restrained 
in its direct appeals to customers, its function was more to manipulate public opinion 
and help make explicit advertising more effective. Intertextualized advertising, the 
company believed, would allow them to make Lucky Strike cigarettes a part of mass 
 43 
 
American society itself. Instead of changing Lucky Strike advertising to fit existing 
American society, intertextuality was the ATC’s attempt to change society to fit 
around Lucky Strike instead.  
“Intertextuality” is not a term typically found in advertising histories, nor was 
it the word that George Hill or any of his contemporaries used to label the advertising 
strategies that they developed in the late 1920s. In recent decades, marketers have 
adopted the term “integrated marketing communication” (IMC) to refer to 
advertisements in different media that are intended to correspond to each other. On 
the other hand, intertextuality is a term used in literary analysis and refers to the 
constructed relationships between texts in the same medium.
86
 George Hill did not 
think of radio, print, film, or product placement as isolated mediums; he grouped 
them all together under the banner of “advertising” so that the ATC could exploit the 
connections between each. Lucky Strike advertising was like an arrow flying towards 
the consumer, he once explained. The advertising theme was the arrowhead, and each 
type of advertisement “must be lined behind that…all streamlined.”
87
 To emphasize 
the rhetorical and thematic connections that existed between different types of Lucky 
Strike advertising, and the ATC’s belief that each type was an integrated part of the 
same medium, will be used to describe this advertising strategy instead of IMC. 
 Historians and marketers usually place the theoretical and conceptual origins 
of IMC in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Citing the atomization of media types such 
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as television and print media into highly specific advertising vehicles targeted to 
niche groups, IMC emerged out of the public relations field as a way to express one 
unified message through a number of specialized mediums.
88
 In 1993, just two years 
after the term “IMC” was first accepted by the marketing community, the concept 
was described as “a new way of looking at the whole, where once we only saw 
parts…it’s realigning communications to look at it the way the customer sees it- as a 
flow of information from indistinguishable sources.”
89
 These same words can be used 
to describe the intertextual advertising that American Tobacco developed in the first 
half of the twentieth century, though these advertisements have never been 
recognized in this way.
90
  
 In order to understand the intersections between American popular culture and 
advertising, it is important to recognize intertextual Lucky Strike advertising as an 
early form of IMC. The role of the cigarette and smoking were shaped by many 
forces within the tobacco industry and in American society at large, and American 
Tobacco sought to harness all of these to improve sales. In this period Americans 
were beginning to experience a variety of new technological and cultural 
developments, and none of these were left untouched by American Tobacco. The 
large advertising appropriations American Tobacco spent intertextualizing its 
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advertising and integrating it into society also helped normalize corporate 
intervention in American life for the rest of the 20
th
 century. 
 When George Hill assumed the presidency, he introduced a number of new 
advertising techniques to promote the Lucky Strike brand. But more importantly, Hill 
made sure that these techniques of advertising always reinforced each other to create 
a highly effective form of advertising synergy. By no means was George Hill the only 
actor in this story; there were many employees of the American Tobacco Company 
and the outside agencies they hired that dreamed up and created the alternative forms 
of advertising that put Lucky Strike at the top of the sales charts. But, Hill was willing 
to spend large sums of money to fund these advertising campaigns (though some 
failed or were not worth the risk) when his peers in other cigarette companies were 
not.
91
 In this chapter, George Hill, Edward Bernays, and a few other names appear 
often when in fact were also many anonymous and forgotten junior executives and 
businessmen who were also critical to Lucky Strike’s success in this period. Though 
their names are not mentioned in this chapter, Hill could not have advertised Lucky 
Strike in such an effective way without them. 
 After Hill assumed total control of American Tobacco following the death of 
his father, Percival Hill, he immediately began dramatic changes to the way the 
company advertised Lucky Strike (see Chapter 1). Along with focusing American 
Tobacco’s advertising resources exclusively on the Lucky Strike brand and 
introducing a range of new advertising tactics, Hill quickly moved to make public 
relations a central pillar in his advertising. In the late 1920s, public relations remained 
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a new field in which many manufacturers and businesses were reluctant to involve 
themselves in. Perhaps this is why Hill did not incorporate it into Lucky Strike 
advertising until after he saw public relations’ impact firsthand- being used by a rival 
to weaken Lucky Strike advertising. Lucky Strike’s first encounter with public 




Bernays, the nephew of and disciple of Sigmund Freud, saw himself as a 
psychoanalyst for corporations and institutions. He specialized in engineering social 
attitudes and norms in order to win the support of the general public.
93
 Bernays 
defined public relations as the “engineering of consent” from the public. His 1947 
essay of the same name identified the three elements that were vital to each public 
relations campaign he designed. The first part was an understanding that the 
consuming public is a raw material to be studied and then manipulated by advertisers. 
Second, was Bernays’ belief that the most effective way to influence the public was 
through emotional appeals. And finally, as he explained it, “the engineer of consent 
must create news.” News stories could be fabricated or described by public relations 
agents in order to ‘shape the attitudes and actions of people.”
94
 
In 1927, Liggett & Myers hired Bernays to promote their Chesterfield brand. 
He began by using front groups, press releases, staged public events, and other similar 
techniques to attack Lucky Strike, which was a rival brand at the time. But, after a 
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few months Ligget & Myers decided not to extend Bernay’s contract, the public 
relations pioneer was quickly hired by George Hill with the understanding that he 
would not work for any other businesses that sold tobacco products.
95
 Hill also hired 
Ivy Lee, another pioneer in the field of public relations in this same period with the 
same agreement that he would also not advise any other tobacco companies on public 
relations. “If I have both of you,” he explained to Bernays, “my competitors can’t get 
either of you.”
96
 By 1928, George Hill had a virtual monopoly on public relations 
talent in the United States, and wasted no time using it to make Lucky Strike 
advertising more effective than rival brands.  
In order to increase sales of Lucky Strike, Bernays believed it was most 
important to focus on changing larger patterns of societal behavior among Americans, 
instead of simply focusing on buying habits and brand loyalty. These larger patterns 
were chosen from the various themes that American Tobacco used in their traditional 
advertising. If Bernays could make a concept such as the medical benefits of smoking 
or slenderness popular in their own right, then it was far more likely that consumers 
would react positively to these same themes when they saw them featured 
prominently in print and radio advertisements.  
Bernays’ first assignment for George Hill was to open up American women to 
the cigarette market and Lucky Strike. Women had long been a target for Hill, who 
became the first major cigarette manufacturer to openly advertise to women with the 
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1927 “Precious Voice” campaign.
97
 By using famous opera women as celebrity 
endorsers, Lucky Strike did improve its sales volume among women who already 
smoked. However, cigarettes were still considered a masculine product and women 
were banned from smoking in most public places. Attributing the growth in female 
smoking to morel degeneracy and the loss of “femininity,” many Americans viewed 
the practice as “unlady-like. Any woman who dared smoke outside the privacy of her 
homes risked criticism or worse.
98
 Though ideas about gender were changing in the 
1920s, the taboo against women smoking was disintegrating too slowly for Hill. With 
Bernays, he believed that intertextualized public relations and regular advertising 
could spur public acceptance of women’s cigarette use. “They’re smoking indoors,” 
Hill confessed, “but, damn it, if they spend half the time outdoors and we can get ‘em 
to smoke outdoors, we’ll damn near double our female market.”
99
 The profits to be 
made unifying men and women together into a single community of smokers 
demanded immediate action and a new advertising strategy. 
In 1928, the same year he began working for American Tobacco, Bernays 
published Propaganda, in which he laid out many of the public relations techniques 
that he would soon use to bolster Lucky Strike advertising. Many of these closely 
resembled the methods that Hill used in print and radio advertising (or would develop 
in the near future), which was an essential part of creating an intertextual web of 
Lucky Strike advertisements that linked all different types of mediums and 
                                                 
97




 Borden, 224-227. 
 
99
 Bernays, 383. 
 49 
 
advertising approaches. “The group mind does not think in the strict sense of the 
word. In place of thoughts it has impulses, habits and emotions. In making up its 
mind its first impulse is usually to follow the example of a trusted leader,”
100
 Bernays 
wrote, arguing that the control of symbols and sources of authority were the best 
ways to persuade the masses to act in a particular way. In his work for American 
Tobacco, he would attempt to use public relations to control these sources of 
influence and align them with print and radio Lucky Strike advertising. 
Before Lucky Strike advertising was strengthened with public relations 
efforts, it tried to attract new female customers through a focus on slenderness. This 
was clear with the infamous slogan “Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet” that Hill 
introduced in 1929. And so after advertising that Lucky Strike cigarettes were a 
healthy and slimming alternative to desserts and other foods that contributed to 
weight gain, Hill and Bernays decided to use public relations in two ways to reinforce 
the “Reach for a Lucky” campaign:  through health and fashion. Rejecting older 
Victorian standards of health and beauty, advertisers had begun portraying 
slenderness as the ideal body type in the early 20th century, but this transition was not 
yet complete in the late 1920s. 
101
 If public relations techniques could promote the 
health and fashion benefits of slimness, then ads that made Lucky Strike essential to a 
slender body would be much more persuasive. 
Bernays began publicizing the links between slenderness and cigarettes 
through fashion designers and photographers. Preferring to keep his own name out of 
any publicity created for any of his clients, he instead opted to have figures already 
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established within the fashion industry work on his behalf. Authority figures such as 
Charles Dana Gibson (noted artist and creator of the famed “Gibson Girl”) and Nancy 
Hardin, editor of the Vogue, were hired by Bernays and sent letters to other influential 
artists and photographers.
102
 These letters praised women who smoked instead of 
eating sweets and asked them to support the “ideal of slimness.”
103
 At the same time, 
Bernays sent these letters and articles secretly written by himself sent to newspapers, 
magazines, and other media outlets. Members of the fashion industry seeking to stay 
current and follow the new trend of slenderness that Bernays was publicizing in the 
press quickly began featuring slender models and slimmer standards of beauty in their 
own work. “The ideal American woman of fashion is slim and she should do 
everything in her power to retain her supple graceful figure,” one article ghostwritten 
by Bernays claimed, “that, at least, is the view of leading fashion experts in this 
country and Canada.”
104
 At the same time, under Bernays’ direction American 
Tobacco began paying high-class clothing stores to feature Lucky Strike cigarettes in 
their fashion displays. Bonwit Teller, a popular department store on New York City’s 
5
th
 Avenue, exhibited packages of Lucky Strikes next to their latest Parisian gowns. 
Events like these were highly publicized by Bernays and his contacts in national 
media, claiming that “it is significant from the women’s angle, say leading stylists, 
that [a 5
th
 Avenue department store] should combine with Lucky Strike to bring this 
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new idea of style and smoking to the women of America.”
105
 Through Bernays’ 
publicity tactics and the financial resources and influence of the American Tobacco 
Company, the cigarette was being shaped into a symbol of high fashion and modern 
beauty, in precisely the same way as Lucky Strike advertisements claimed. 
Along with creating positive publicity for the slender figure, Bernays and Hill 
used public relations to create a negative image of candy and dessert foods, focusing 
on sugar as a harmful substance that caused obesity and other health issues. In late 
1928 when Lucky Strike advertising copy began to stress moderation in fat intake 
(accomplished by smoking cigarettes) as a means to achieve a slender figure, Bernays 
moved to publicize the idea of moderation in the public mind. Moderate diets were 
promoted through the media and through a number of authoritative figures under 
Bernays’ influence. Hill and Bernays would not go as far as to actually fabricate 
entire stories about the dangers of sugar or the slimming abilities of cigarettes, but 
they did exaggerate and distort statements and opinions given from medical 
authorities in order to make them fall in line with their anti-fat agenda. Hill personally 
sent copies of Dr. Clarence Leib’s 1929 book Eat, Drink, and be Slender to medical 
journals, newspapers, and industry officials as proof that excess sugar in a diet was 
unhealthy and dangerous.
106
 Also, health commissioners and other medical figures 
were paid by American Tobacco to promote Dr. Leib’s book and warn of the dangers 
of sugar as a public health issue, furthering the negative image that sugar held in the 
                                                 
105
 Distribution Copy of “Cigarettes Go Fifth Avenue,” 1932, Bernays Papers, Series I, Box 
84, Folder 4. 
 
106
 Though Leib’s book does briefly note that “a cigarette makes an excellent filler-in and 
substitute for a course which our obesity diet excludes,” there are few mentions of tobacco or 
cigarettes throughout. Most of the book is spent criticizing sugar, which Leib calls “your arch enemy” 
Clarence W. Leib, East, Drink and Be Slender: What Every Overweight Person Should Know and Do. 
(New York: John Day Company, 1929), 145, 130. 
public’s view.
107
 With the danger and ugliness that sugar brought, Lucky Strike ads 
that offered a modern, rational substitute to sugar became all the more appealing, 
despite the fact that anti-sugar publications rarely even mentioned tobacco as a 
positive alternative. 
In Bernays’ autobiography, he mentions that Hill and other advertising 
executives at American Tobacco did not always agree with his advice. In order to 
strengthen public support for the “moderation” theme in Lucky Strike advertisements, 
Bernays proposed an extensive, long-term campaign that would have funded the 
creation of a Moderation League and promoted moderation in all aspects of life 
(especially in the diet) over a period of years. But as he quickly learned, “Hill was not 
at receptive to my comprehensive plan for a broad, integrated moderation campaign; 
he was only interested in…specific action.” Surprised, Bernays condescendingly 
wrote that Hill and his advertising staff “tend[ed] to regard intermediate and long-
range planning as impractical, eccentric and a nuisance…They want[ed] ad hoc 
action.”
108
 But what Bernays did not understand about Hill’s advertising was its 
tendency to change quickly. Since Hill treated his advertisements like news stories 
and, he feared the public would grow tired of them quickly and never used an 
advertising campaign long enough for it to fade from public interest.
109
 Publicity, 
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then, would have to be designed with the same principles in mind. A long-term 
campaign like the one that Bernays favored would take months or even years to take 
hold of the public. And though eventually a long-term publicity campaign might do 
more to sway the public opinion on moderation and make it more receptive to the 
moderation theme, American Tobacco could have moved on to use a different theme 
by then. Hill kept public relations on the same pace with other Lucky Strike 
advertising. It was the unity between the two that made them effective. 
Instead of creating a Moderation League as he had originally advised, Bernays 
turned to dramatic media events to keep the moderation theme in the public mind. 
Turning again to authority figures that consumers trusted and admired, the famous 
Ziegfeld Follies were enlisted in a publicity stunt that promoted moderation and 
bashed sugar and other products that competed with cigarettes. In late 1929, six 
Ziegfeld Follies came to the glamorous Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York City, and 
publically announced that they were establishing the “Ziegfeld Contour, Curve and 
Charm Club.” Reciting a pledge that was actually written by Bernays, each woman 
promised that “I pledge myself to slenderness…I renounce the false pleasures of the 
table—fattening foods, drinks, and cloying sweets, but I make no sacrifice: I shall 
smoke cigarettes.”
110
 Making sure that the national media was well informed of the 
staged event, Bernays sent out press releases and made sure that a number of 
reporters were on hand to witness the event. The Follies were at the height of their 
fame in the late 1920s, following the successful run of the stage play Whoopie! which 
had been performed in hundreds of locations nation-wide. As the Follies continued to 
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tour the United States, they now became arbiters of moderation and self-control and 
implicit supporters of cigarettes. Not coincidentally, that same year George Hill ran a 
series of print advertisements that featured several members of the Ziegfeld Follies 




The Ziegfeld moderation event served to combine positive cigarette publicity 
and association with health and fashion, recognized sources of trusted authority, 
national visibility, and an intertextual link between advertising and current news and 
popular culture in a single event. “Beyond all reasonable doubt…they are the fashion 
arbiters of the nation,”  one Atlanta newspaper wrote shortly after the event, “if the 
Follies ladies decided to wear cast-iron bustles, the vogue would become 
nationwide,” revealing the enormous influence they had on many American women 
who were also being exposed and targeted by Lucky Strike advertising.
112
 By using 
public relations and advertising in harmony, Lucky Strike cigarettes were transformed 
into symbols of fashion, a healthy and moderate lifestyle, and popular culture 
endorsed by the Ziegfeld Follies.  
Invigorated by the success of the Ziegfeld Follies moderation event, Hill and 
Bernays engineered an even larger publicity event to popularize smoking among 
women and reinforce current Lucky Strike advertising. Though smoking for women 
had been building momentum after the moderation campaign and previous 
advertising campaigns by Lucky Strike and other cigarette brands, it was still not 
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socially acceptable for women to smoke in public. Any progress that Hill had made 
before 1929 had been to make cigarettes a domestic product for women, to be used in 
the home away from the private sphere.
113
 In order to make Lucky Strike cigarettes a 
product that women would be comfortable using in public, Hill and Bernays 
consulted a leading psychoanalyst to determine what would break the taboo. 
According to A.A. Brill, women subconsciously viewed the cigarette as a masculine 
product and a source of social freedom. “It is perfectly normal for women to want to 
smoke cigarettes…today the emancipation of women has suppressed many of their 
feminine desires,” he explained to Bernays.
114
 The Women’s Rights Movement had 
penetrated American society on all sorts of political, cultural, and social levels by the 
end of the 1920s, and Hill and Bernays decided that this trend could be leveraged to 
sell cigarettes. 
Lucky Strike ads had used Amelia Earhart and other progressive women as 
celebrity endorsements since 1927, but never attempted to change the symbolic or 
social attributes of the cigarette. After Brill’s suggestion that women subconsciously 
viewed the cigarette as a source of freedom and symbol of equality with men, 
Bernays and Hill decided to publicize cigarettes as “torches of freedom.” Using this 
term helped bring women and the cigarette into the public sphere together. Unlike 
leisure, fashion, and public health-concepts that could all be thought of as exclusively 
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private or personal- characterizing cigarettes as “torches of freedom” made women’s 
smoking a public issue that took place on the street and in other open places. 
Following the example set by the Ziegfeld Moderation campaign, Bernays and Hill 
again began to design a noteworthy public act that could get picked up by national 
media and distributed to consumers across the United States. The annual Easter 
Parade in New York City was a popular event that many Americans used to see the 
latest styles and trends in society, and it was here that debutantes and models hired by 
Bernays would attack traditional gender norms and support Women’s Rights, by 
publically smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes.  
As the plan unfolded, debutantes and other fashionable young women living 
in New York City were contacted by Ruth Hale, a popular journalist, public figure, 
and advocate for improved social and political rights for women.
115
 According to 
Bernays, Hale “was glad to find a platform for her views, which happened to coincide 
with [the ATC’s],” and asked the debutantes to “fight another sex taboo…light 
another torch of freedom by smoking cigarettes while strolling on Fifth Avenue 
Easter Sunday.”
116
 Though the words seemed like the feminist rhetoric Hale was 
known for, they were carefully written by Bernays and signed and distributed under 
her name. The women that Hale enlisted were also specifically chosen by Bernays 
and Hill in order to have a maximum impact on publicity. An American Tobacco 
memorandum outlining the 1929 Easter Parade insisted that “discretion should be 
used in their selection…actresses should definitely be out…while they should be 
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good looking, they should not look too “model-y.”
117
 Though Hill had used 
celebrities in the past to advertise Lucky Strike, using more ordinary looking women 
to publicize cigarettes in the Easter Parade helped bring smoking into the public 
sphere. It was more effective to use women who looked like they had come from the 
home and out into pubic to smoke, as one historian described to combine “the symbol 
of the emancipated flapper with that of the committed suffragist.”
118
  
 In no small part due to Bernays’ efforts outside of the public eye, the media 
quickly took up the story of smoking feminists in the Easter Parade and swiftly spread 
it across the United States.
119
 Though the story usually had to share space with other 
parade highlights, newspapers as prestigious and well-circulated as the New York 
Times featured the Torches of Freedom in their headlines and reported it favorably.
120
 
Old debates on women smoking quickly resurfaced after accounts of smoking 
suffragettes were published, which helped American Tobacco keep the same ideas on 
the public’s mind for an even longer amount of time. Bernays had hoped that there 
would be critics of the Torches of Freedom, and that a national debate over smoking 
would benefit Lucky Strike sales as it had in the anti-fat campaigns of the previous 
year. “Undoubtedly after the stories and pictures have appeared, there will be protests 
from non-smokers and believers in ‘Heaven, home and mother,” Bernays wrote in a 
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 Not willing to leave any part of the Easter Parade to chance, Bernays insisted that “we 
should have a photographer to take pictures for use later…to guard against the possibility that the news 




 "Easter Sun Finds the Past in Shadow at Modern Parade: Group of Girls Puff at Cigarettes 
as Gesture of "Freedom"- Resorts Well Filled." The New York Times, April 1, 1929, 1. 
memo to Hill shortly before the Easter Parade, “these should be watched for and 
answered in the same papers.
121
 Though the Torches of Freedom March was not the 
deciding factor for many, it was a catalyst for getting women to begin smoking and to 
smoke outdoors without fear of criticism.   
 For the rest of 1929, Lucky Strike advertisements featured themes and 
symbols that were clearly in tune with the Torches of Freedom March. The image of 
the modern, liberated and socially equal American woman was the focus a new ad 
series that read “An Ancient Prejudice has been Revealed.” Featuring images of 
chains labeled as oppression being broken by the modern American woman, Lucky 
Strike ads used rhetoric that sounded the same as Ruth Hale’s words when she called 
on American women to publically smoke and support Women’s Rights.
122
  
The publicity and media attention that the Torches of Freedom generated in 
the United States was neatly tied to Lucky Strike advertising and made new ads much 
stronger than they would have been by themselves. Since Hill and Bernays 
engineered the entire Torches of Freedom march, they were able to create a very 
specific image of the ideal woman who was fashionable and socially conscious. After 
mass publicity exposed millions of American women to this image and pressured 
them to imitate it, ads that offered to make this image available to anyone who 
purchased Lucky Strike stood to benefit enormously.  
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Bernays’ relationship with George Hill and American Tobacco did not last. 
But before the public relations expert left American Tobacco in 1936, he drafted a 
memorandum that outlined a central piece of the company’s alternative advertising 
strategies. “As in other customs and fashions, the screen reflects the actual condition 
of our daily life…there is many a psychological need for a cigarette in the movies,” 
he wrote, explaining: “the bashful hero lights a cigarette, the better to gain a hold on 
himself in his trying interview with his future father-in-law. The villain smokes hasty 
puffs, to hide his nervousness or to ease his bad conscience” If used correctly, the 
cigarette could be used as a film prop that could enhance the meaning of scenes and 
promote smoking in audiences. “Everything,” Bernays concluded, “from the gayest 
comedy, to the most sinister tragedy can be expressed by a cigarette, in the hands or 
mouth of the skillful actor.”
123
 Embedding advertising and promoting cigarette 
through film was not a new concept in the early 1930s, but product placement offered 
another way to expand Lucky Strike advertising and connect it with other influential 
mediums in popular American culture.  
 The movie theater was a popular place for early twentieth century Americans 
from all walks of life, and its influence on their lives was enormous. Observations of 
the film industry often noted that films were powerful socializing forces, teaching 
viewers how to act and live in modern American society. “No fashion magazine, 
however skillfully edited, can compete with [Hollywood] when it comes to making it 
seem imperative to own a particular hat or necklace,” wrote one observer in 1939. 
“Neither adjectives nor photographs nor drawings,” she continued, “can make a 
woman feel about an evening wrap as she feels when she sees it on the shoulders of 
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Irene Dunne or in the arms of William Powell.”
124
 This same force could be used to 
sell cigarettes as well.  
 The relationship between Hollywood and Madison Avenue was well 
established in the 1930s. Movie theaters were places where large groups regularly 
congregated and were a captive audience until the end of the film, and advertisers 
quickly realized the potential this medium had for promoting various products and 
brands.
125
 By the late 1920s, theaters were places of entertainment and open 
advertising. Though advertisers did pay for their brands to be featured within films, 
they often preferred to have theaters play short one reel ads before and after movies 
or to have advertising operations in cinema lobbies. By 1931, it was reported that 
more than half of all American cinemas showed advertising programs either before or 
during films.
126
 However, there was significant backlash against direct advertising 
movie theaters from movie goers and film producers, much like similar criticisms 
against the excesses of advertising in radio and in print. “They [the public] pay at the 
box office for entertainment,” protested the founder of Universal Studios, “believe 
me, if you jam advertising down their throats and pack their eyes and ears with it you 
will build up resentment that will in time damn your business.”
127
 Using film to 
advertise Lucky Strike held the potential to vastly improve the image of the cigarette 
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and boost sales, but it would need to be done in a way that did not risk antagonizing 
viewers by appearing too commercial. Just as they had incorporated the news into 
their intertextual advertising system, Hill and his advertisers would manipulate films 
so they could be associated with Lucky Strikes. 
 Though American Tobacco did advertise Lucky Strike directly in theaters via 
“playlets” and other short commercials shown alongside feature films, the vast 
majority of their use of the film industry came in the form of product placement and 
paid testimonials from film stars.
128
 Early in his presidential career, George Hill had 
come to see the popularity and influence that celebrities had in American society, and 
that this influence could be manipulated to sell cigarettes. By associating the brand 
with entertainers, politicians, doctors, and other prominent figures, Lucky Strike was 
imbued with the social authority these figures held and legitimized the consumption 
of the product in a social setting. Testimonials had proven controversial for the ATC 
as a result of over-saturation and the revelation that celebrities did not use the 
products they endorsed; they were recognized as an important factor in the rapid 
success that Lucky Strike saw in the late 1920s. 
 Scores of actors, directors, playwrights, and other famous celebrities were 
hired by American Tobacco throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and endorsed Lucky 
Strike cigarettes in print and radio advertisements. Between 1937 and 1938 alone the 
company had well over 130 prominent radio, theater, and film personalities on their 
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129
Just like American Tobacco preferred using theaters with reliably large 
audiences, they also actively sought out the most popular actors in the film industry to 
endorse Lucky Strikes. “In other words,” one American Tobacco executive said, “we 
don’t want to put a plug [use a celebrity endorsement] in about a class “B” picture no 
one is ever going to see.”
130
 American Tobacco’s testimonial campaigns were aimed 
at appealing to the largest group of viewers possible, so any actor or actress with a 




 American Tobacco was not simply concerned with the quality and popularity 
of the stars they were hiring, however. Indeed, the quantity of actors, actresses, and 
other prominent figures from the film industry was also a top concern. American 
Tobacco dominated the tobacco industry in celebrity endorsements from the film 
industry from the late 1920s through the 1940s. While rivals brands like Camel often 
bought testimonials from athletes and other popular figures, no other brand came 
close to Lucky Strike in terms of total endorsements from movie actors or 
directors.
132
 These testimonials, written by copywriters at American Tobacco and 
Lord & Thomas, were couched in language that suggested Hollywood exclusively 
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 A 1937 print testimonial made the claim that “of the many 
trends that sweep through Hollywood, one of the longest lasting has been the 
preference for Luckies. I once asked a ‘property’ man—who supplies cigarettes to the 
actors—what his favorite is. He answered by opening up a box containing cigarettes. 
They were all Luckies.”
134
 Similar testimonials spoke of actors always being able to 
borrow a Lucky Strike from literally any actor they met in Hollywood, as it was 
everyone’s favorite brand. American Tobacco published dozens of ads with this same 
message throughout this period, creating the impression that behind the silver screen 
was a cloud of Lucky Strike smoke, and that no other brands had a place in the film 
industry. “It certainly is the cigarette of the acting profession,” one testimonial 




 Year after year, American Tobacco continued publishing ads that linked 
Lucky Strikes with every part of the film industry. The campaign peaked between 
1937 and 1938, when over sixty new endorsements from movie stars and other 
Hollywood figures were signed to American Tobacco and released through print and 
radio.
136
 The short testimonial contracts that were signed by celebrities were clearly 
worded in a way that supported the ATC’s campaign to associate Hollywood with 
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Lucky Strike long after their particular advertisement was published. Signers were 
given a year’s supply of Lucky Strike cigarettes, one carton per week, so that they 
could be seen smoking the brand at press interviews or other public events. American 
Tobacco also had the right to have these celebrities appear on radio shows that they 
broadcast. Music and variety shows like Your Hit Parade, Your Hollywood Parade, 
and The Jack Benny Show were sponsored by Lucky Strike and were also effective 
spots for promotion. In order to tie print and radio ads to these on-air celebrity 
interviews, contracts stated that Lucky Strike radio shows were “to include the 
broadcasting of [a celebrity’s testimonial] statement in whole or in part, which such 
variations as do not change the substance of such statement.” Further, celebrities 
agreed to not allow their name or image to be used in the advertisement of any other 
cigarette or tobacco product or to make any public appearances for any other 
company connected to the tobacco industry.
137
 Just like he had aggressively bought 
up all public relations talent in the industry, George Hill paid handsomely for a virtual 
monopoly in movie star power. 
 As testimonials from the Hollywood elite were becoming a significant 
component of Lucky Strike advertising, the cigarette became an important prop in the 
movies. Realizing early on that the movies themselves could be the most effective site 
of cigarette advertising, the ATC encouraged and pressured the film industry to 
include cigarettes in positive and central roles in all films.
138
 In the outline that he had 
distributed to film directors and other influential figures who worked on studio lots, 
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Edward Bernays had explained that “a great deal can be said with a cigarette which 
would ordinarily require a great many words to express.”
139
 While he was still 
employed by American Tobacco, Bernays distributed documents to directors and 
other important figures on film lots which helped establish cigarettes as useful props 
in the movies. In order to effectively use movies as advertisements for Lucky Strikes, 
cigarettes needed to become central objects on the screen, driving plots and defining 
characters.   
After the major studios began rigidly self-censoring films in 1934, the 
cigarette offered a milder metaphor for sex when more overt displays were banned by 
the Hays Code. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of smoking in this era was 
the 1942 drama Now, Voyager. After one legendary scene in which Paul Henreid 
romantically lights two cigarettes in his mouth and gives one to romantic interest 
Bette Davis, the sexual intimacy between the two stars was abundantly clear. Now, 
Voyager was but one film of many that portrayed cigarettes in a positive and 
glamorous fashion, and would be imitated by many adoring fans. According to one 
film historian, Henreid’s cigarette trick “became the preferred romantic gesture of 
thousands of high school students that year.”
140
  Not coincidentally, Davis had been 
endorsing Lucky Strikes since 1937. Other Lucky Strike ads published around the 
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 Romance and glamour were not the only emotions to be demonstrated by 
cigarettes in the movies. American Tobacco saw to it that leading actors and actresses 
smoked cigarettes to portray a variety of positive and desirable traits that Americans 
were exposed to most movies they saw.
142
 Due in part to criticism against product 
placement within the film industry and from the general public, cigarettes seen in the 
movies were almost always shown without any distinguishable brand marks. The 
company believed that avoiding brand names and blatant references to Lucky Strike 
helped keep audiences happier in the movie theater and unaware that they were being 
exposed to advertising. It was the numerous testimonials and endorsements of Lucky 
Strikes that actors and actresses gave and the advertisements that were designed to 
imitate Hollywood glitz and glamour that put Lucky Strike on the silver screen. 
According to a 2008 study of Hollywood cigarette endorsements, Lucky Strike 
“dominated the early period of cross-promotional cigarette advertising,” and hired 
dozens more film celebrities than the rest of the industry combined.
143
 After 
advertising and publicity campaigns created the impression that everyone smoked 
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Lucky Strikes in Hollywood, a moviegoer could assume that the only brands being 
used in the movie was Lucky Strike as well.  
With the support of mass Lucky Strike advertising behind it and the 
connections between the brand and Hollywood glaringly clear, George Hill was able 
to turn the movies into one of his more effective advertisements. Without his policy 
of intertextualizing advertising mediums and campaigns, it would have been 
impossible to make Hollywood another source for teaching Americans how to use 
cigarettes and to normalize them in popular culture.
144
 Intertextual advertising worked 
both ways. Advertisements that synced with the popular films of the day became 
much more effective than they would have been on their own. Having the popularity 
of Hollywood backing Lucky Strike advertisements helped them attract attention and 
fit the brand into society. Intertextuality also hid the blatant commercialism and direct 
influence of American Tobacco from film audiences. Consumers were more likely to 
purchase cigarettes- or any other product for that matter- if they believed that they 
were buying it of their own free will and were not being coerced by an advertising 
message. By using the movies to promote smoking and endow the Lucky Strike brand 
with positive qualities and emotions, consumers could feel like they still maintained 
their agency and were not being coerced into buying cigarettes.
145
 
 In recent decades, historians have identified the Lucky Strike public relations 
and product placement campaigns as noteworthy components of American Tobacco’s 
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 Bernays called this illusion or manipulation of consumer agency the “engineering of 
consent.” Though he was not responsible for American Tobacco’s film advertising strategies, his 
earlier work on the Torches of Freedom March and in popularizing slender figures undoubtedly 
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advertising strategy and have directly correlated them with the sharp rise in sales that 
occurred in the late 1920 and continued after George Hill’s death in 1946. Lucky 
Strike’s high sales at a significantly lower advertising cost per cigarette (compared to 
comparable brands) was in large part due to the successful connections of print, radio, 
news, and film in the public mind. In order to fully understand American Tobacco’s 
advertising strategies and how the company thought of the Lucky Strike brand, it is 
also important to investigate the American Tobacco Building in the New York 
World’s Fair. On display in 1939 and 1940, the building celebrated Lucky Strike 
manufacturing and welcomed thousands of visitors through its doors. 
 The New York World’s Fair was held from April 1939 to October 1940, 
during which an estimated 39 million entrance tickets were sold.
146
 There were 
hundreds of exhibits that covered the Fair’s enormous grounds, offering visitors 
everything from amusement park rides to displays of heavy industry and cultural 
exhibits from nations around the world. Despite their wide range of subjects and 
exhibit materials, there were two distinct Fair themes that tied exhibits together. First, 
the Fair was styled as “The World of Tomorrow.” Envisioning a future where the 
wonders of machines and advanced technology improved the quality of life for all. 
The Official Guidebook to the Fair described this utopian vision, writing “the eyes of 
the Fair are on the future…in the sense of presenting a new and clearer view of today 
in preparation for tomorrow.”
147
 The second theme, “democracy,” was closely tied 
into the Fair’s vision of the future. The Fair’s Committee on Theme announced that 
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the Fair “is planned to be ‘everyman’s fair—to show the way toward the 
improvement of all the factors contributing to human welfare.”
148
 The image of a 
positive future where the masses would have the freedom to consume was carried 
throughout the Fair, and was the same idea that American Tobacco executives would 
try to associate with the Lucky Strike exhibit. 
 The American Tobacco Building was located in the “Food Section,” in a 
central location about 600 feet east of the Fair’s famous Trylon and Perisphere 
structures. Being located in such proximity to the centerpieces of the Fair meant that 
the American Tobacco Building was in a highly trafficked area of the fair where 
many visitors would pass by on their way to the rest of the fairgrounds. To attract 
attention, the exterior of the building was painted white and modeled after a Lucky 
Strike cigarette package, complete with the iconic red and green target logo on the 
front. The building’s sleek and modern design helped it visually associate with the 
themes and general atmosphere of the Fair with Lucky Strike. Though the building 
was officially called the American Tobacco Building, it was dedicated exclusively to 
the Lucky Strike brand. The exhibit was designed just to celebrate Luckies, a fact 
made even clearer to visitors once they came inside.  
 As a visitor made their way inside, the first thing they could see was the large 
cigarette-making, packing, and sealing machines. Located in the front of the building, 
large plate glass windows made these machines and their operators visible to outside 
passersby and set them apart from the rest of the exhibit.
149
 These were specially 
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Documents Online, 3. Tobacco Documents Online is a digital repository for papers from the tobacco 
designed to allow viewers to see inside each machine and observe the actual 
processes that manufactured each cigarette. At the helm of every machine was a 
smiling white worker, another attempt by the ATC to exclude people of color from 
the world of Lucky Strike cigarettes. In reality, there were many black workers in the 
tobacco fields and in ATC factories, yet the exhibit’s windows distorted the racial 
reality of cigarette manufacturing to anyone who passed by.
150
 
Next to the cigarette machines was a large “U” shaped exhibition space where 
visitors could easily see the entire room and its many displays all at once. The back 
wall opposite the front machinery was divided into sections that had dioramas of 
tobacco cultivation and auctioning, maps of the United States and other regions where 
different types of tobacco are grown, and a large collage of photographs showing the 
ATC research lab and quality control efforts. In the center of this back wall was a 
movie screen that regularly played a short film about cigarette production in the 
company’s Richmond factory. Using striking colors and visual cues from the film, the 
ATC sought to demonstrate the diversity in tobacco types that went into their 
cigarettes, and the scientifically advanced processes that blended these materials 
together in every Lucky Strike.
151
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 Though the American Tobacco Building was focused on Lucky Strike 
manufacturing, it also sold cigarettes to any visitors who were interested. A counter 
located next to the manufacturing display space sold customers souvenir packs of 
cigarettes that could be mailed from the building to anywhere in the United States. 
These cartons were specially designed for the Fair and featured silhouettes of the 
famous Trylon and Perisphere on the side, yet again visually linking the Fair and its 
themes to the Lucky Strike brand. Along with Lucky Strike cigarettes, the sales 
counter also distributed copies of The Story of Lucky Strike, a history of the ATC and 
account of the Lucky Strike manufacturing process that mirrored the information 
displayed in the exhibit.
152
  Both the World’s Fair edition Lucky Strikes and book 




 Despite the pretense of being an educational exhibit or artistic expression of 
modern manufacturing, the American Tobacco Building was designed from the start 
to be an advertisement for Lucky Strikes. “The exhibit is really another medium of 
advertising Lucky Strike cigarettes,” company executives insisted in the exhibit plan. 
The American Tobacco Building was also labeled as “Salesmanship in Person,” and 
company vice-president Paul Hahn hoped that the visual display of Lucky Strike 
would influence potential customers in the same ways that a salesman would in a 
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store or on the street.
154
 Each part of the building’s design and displays were 
consciously associated with the themes of the Fair in order to connect advertising at 
the Fair with print and radio ad campaigns published at the same time. This way, the 
American Tobacco Building and the World’s Fair were intertextualized and made a 
part of Lucky Strike advertising. 
 The Fair’s “World of Tomorrow” and democracy themes aimed to create 
show visitors an egalitarian vision of the future where American democracy was 
grounded in consumer capitalism.
155
 This fit closely with existing Lucky Strike 
advertising campaigns that thought of the consuming public as a single mass 
audience. In its official guide book, Fair President Grover Whalen welcomed visitors 
writing “this is your Fair, built for you and dedicated to you.”
156
 In homes across the 
United States, radio listeners had been hearing identical messages of mass democratic 
participation in consumerism for years on Your Hit Parade, the music show 
sponsored by Lucky Strike.
157
 Indeed, the emphasis on the word “your” in the guide 
book was similar to the emphasis in the name Your Hit Parade, and demonstrate how 
both were intended to make visitors/listeners feel like they were personally involved 
in the process of consumption. 
 Giving visitors a feeling of agency and control was an important part of the 
American Tobacco Building, which was designed to literally put people in the middle 
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of the Lucky Strike manufacturing process. By having the only open space in the 
building surrounded by maps of tobacco growing regions, machinery, and pictures of 
research labs, the emphasis in this exhibit was on demystifying the process of creation 
in Lucky Strike cigarettes. In this respect, the building fit closely with the rest of the 
Fair, where exhibitors realized that a fair dedicated to a consumer-driven society 
needed to focus more on the process than on the end product or the machines that 
made them. Making a visitor a part of the process was an important part of 
democratic capitalism.
158
  The large open space that contained all building visitors 
was significant in one other way: it was designed to show visitors that they were part 
of a large crowd. Since the late 1920s, advertisements had often made reference to the 
millions of Americans who bought and enjoyed smoking Lucky Strikes.  Your Hit 
Parade and other sponsored radio shows repeatedly mentioned the large listening 
audience which was a part of the song selection process. At the Fair, exhibits used the 
crowd “both as actor and as decoration of great power… [Fair] designers found out 
that the crowd’s greatest pleasure is in the crowd.”
159
  
 American Tobacco advertising executives wanted to create an exhibit where 
“there will be demonstrated the various advertising stories that have heretofore been 
told in…commercials.”
160
 Inside the American Tobacco Building, displays showed 
visitors the “toasting” process that was a prominent part of Lucky Strike ads since 
1917.
161
 The short film shown in the exhibit also featured the ultraviolet rays that 
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were used in the toasting process, a fact which had also been included in Lucky Strike 
ads since 1931. By including “toasting” and ultraviolet rays in the exhibit, advertising 
claims that had existed for years only in print and as invisible radio messages 
suddenly became tangible and real. Visitors could see the manufacturing processes 
that turned raw tobacco into the recognizable Lucky Strike cigarette. Without years of 
previous advertising, the display of tobacco toasting would have been much less 
familiar to viewers. At the same time, allowing millions of visitors to view the 
toasting process first-hand reinforced other mediums of advertising that mentioned 
the process.  
 American Tobacco was the only cigarette manufacturer to have an exhibit at 
the World’s Fair, and their participation is useful in understanding how the company 
thought of itself in the late 1930s. The World’s Fair was an important cultural event 
in American society, and it is clear that the company felt it was important to have 
Lucky Strike included in it. Regardless of how many visitors actually walked into the 
exhibit and were actually convinced to buy Lucky Strikes afterwards, the ATC’s 
primary goal was to have Lucky Strike be included in the Fair’s fantastic vision of the 
future.
 162
 The resources the company put into constructing and maintaining the 
exhibit for two years reveal the sense of self-importance that the American Tobacco 
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In the decades since American Tobacco intertextualized public relations 
campaigns, Hollywood films, and the New York World’s Fair with print and radio 
advertising, the rest of the advertising industry has come to embrace integrated 
marketing as an essential part of American business. Since the late 1980s advertisers 
have repackaged the concepts and systems that worked for Lucky Strike under the 
“Integrated Marketing Approach” label and have been reaching American consumers 
from across multiple communication mediums with unified sales messages. But the 
efforts of American Tobacco during the George Hill years show that this approach to 
advertising worked much earlier in the 20
th
 century as well. Successful intertextual 
advertising utilized advertising campaigns that were designed to mesh rhetorically 
and thematically with each other. These connections helped shape the meanings that 
consumers found in each separate advertisement and created a stronger advertising 
campaign that was stronger than any of its individual parts. By integrating advertising 
mediums together, the ATC further demonstrated their belief in a mass consumer 
audience that should be targeted with a single unifying theme. Intertextual advertising 
was also at its most effective when it targeted Americans on an emotional or social 
level. Charging Lucky Strikes with positive qualities associated with accepted social 
movements and influential figures in popular culture and American society at large 
helped break old taboos associated with smoking and made the brand stand out from 
its rivals.  
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The intertextuality of Lucky Strike advertising demonstrates the American Tobacco 
Company’s belief that a mass audience was best persuaded by a single message that 
was repeated and reinforced through many different advertising mediums. Regardless 
of if a Lucky Strike ad took the form of a newspaper article, radio show, popular film, 
or World’s Fair exhibit, viewers could count on seeing the same theme of modernity 
each time. The American Tobacco Company was not the first corporation to utilize 
public relations, or product placement, or to advertise in large events like the World’s 
Fair. But George Hill made American Tobacco one of the first major American 
companies to use so many different forms of alternative advertising on a mass scale, 
and was a pioneer in the successful integration of these mediums in ways that resulted 
in noticeable increases in general cigarette use in the United States and in kept Lucky 
Strike at the top of the tobacco industry. 
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Chapter 3: Selling a Nation of the Air: Lucky Strike Radio 




, 1936. It’s Saturday night and around thirty or forty million 
Americans are tuning in to the National Broadcasting Corporation Red Network to 
hear the hottest songs on the air. Al Goodman is conducting the orchestra and the 
popular Broadway songwriter is sure to not disappoint with tonight’s performance. 
But the songs listeners heard were not selected by Goodman, nor were they chosen by 
his orchestra or NBC or even the show’s sponsor, Lucky Strike cigarettes. No, when 
Your Hit Parade came on each week, listeners could count on hearing songs they had 
actually chosen. “Once again, the voice of the people has spoken in selecting the 
tunes for Your Hit Parade,” the announcer assured each eager listener, “New Yorkers 
and Californians, Northerners and Southerners, men, women and children—one 
hundred and twenty million of you have told us what you want to hear this Saturday 
night.”
164
 After this announcement, the Hit Paraders Orchestra immediately began to 
play “No Other One,” a popular song that ranked eleventh that week. Fourteen more 
songs would be played before the hour was over, all of them determined from nation-
wide surveys of sheet music sales and dance hall requests. Like many other programs 
of the 1930s and 1940s, Your Hit Parade was expressly billed as a show for the entire 
nation. When listeners heard the show, they knew they were enjoying the same songs 
their distant neighbors in every corner of the country liked as well. “If you could 
make a non-stop flight starting in Pittsburgh and finishing in Los Angeles,” the 
announcer reassured the audience after playing the week’s number three song 
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“Alone,” “you’d find that in both towns this melody is the third most popular 




However, Your Hit Parade listeners would not just be hearing the nation’s 
choice songs that Saturday night. Two songs later, as the orchestra neared the end of 
“Red Sails in the Sunset,” the music swelled and faded away and the announcer’s 
voice returned. But this time, instead of discussing the songs or what towns especially 
liked them, he had a different message. First, an anecdote about a train conductor 
pausing to smoke a cigarette after a successful journey. As he watches his passengers 
disembark safely he takes a long draw on his Lucky Strike in this pause before he 
departs to his next destination. Then came a short sketch describing a woman 
smoking from her balcony high above the New York City streets. Her throat is 
sensitive so she chooses Lucky Strike because it offers her the protection from 
tobacco’s irritants she needs and also provides a leisurely and enjoyable smoking 
experience. “Yes, Luckies please most smokers,” the announcer claimed, mirroring 
the language that he used to describe the nation’s choice in songs earlier, “they’re 
made of center leaf tobacco, the finest grown. And the private Lucky Strike process… 
ITS TOASTED, which removes certain harsh irritants naturally present in all 
tobaccos, is your protection against irritation, against cough.”
166
 Just like the 
producers of Your Hit Parade applied their tabulation process to raw data and 
statistics to determine the nation’s favorite songs, the American Tobacco Company 
put its tobacco through advanced chemical and mechanical processes to create 
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America’s favorite cigarette. Announcements like this would pierce the air five more 
times before Your Hit Parade finished its repertoire of melodies, each with the same 
message promoting Lucky Strike as the nation’s choice in cigarette. The announcer 
made this connection quite clear later in the broadcast, saying “when Mr. and Mrs. 
America start telling us what they want in a cigarette, we get a variety of 




Your Hit Parade was one of the most popular radio programs of the 1930s and 
1940s and is probably the best remembered show sponsored by Lucky Strike. But, it 
was not the only show to broadcast Lucky Strike advertising. The American Tobacco 
Company (ATC), manufacturers of Lucky Strike cigarettes, sponsored no less than 
twelve distinct radio programs between 1926 and 1946. In this time, company 
president George Washington Hill became an important pioneer and innovator in the 
field of radio advertising. Hill was one of the first corporate executives to use the 
medium as a serious platform for mass advertising during radio’s infancy. No price 
was too large for Hill, who spared no expense hiring the finest radio talents and most 
popular stars of the air to produce and perform his programs. However, as the ATC 
increasingly poured resources into radio (upwards of $2 million annually by 1931), 
the total advertising budget for the company actually dropped. By the end of the 
1930s, American Tobacco was spending less than fifty percent on its annual 
advertising budget than it had been in the beginning of the decade.
168
 At the same 
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time, sales of Lucky Strikes remained consistently high throughout George Hill’s 
presidency.
169
 Despite fierce competition from rival cigarette brands, the grim 
realities of the Great Depression, and a host of other obstacles it is clear that radio 
was keeping Lucky Strike on Americans’ minds and in their hands. 
The successful shows American Tobacco sponsored under Hill’s direction 
always adhered to a number of underlying principles. Though some Lucky Strike 
shows fizzled and were quickly taken off the air, Your Hit Parade, Kay Kyser’s 
College of Musical Knowledge, The Jack Benny Program, and several other shows all 
utilized the same core elements. First and foremost, programs sponsored by American 
Tobacco and Lucky Strike were advertising. Entertainment came second.
170
 George 
Hill engineered shows that would generate the largest audiences possible and expose 
them to as much advertising as possible. Having enjoyable entertainment kept 
audiences tuned in, but this was only meant to generate sales, nothing more. In 
response to his many critics and listeners who complained about the incessant sales 
pitches and ear-shattering repetition of Lucky Strike slogans on the air, Hill replied 
“Certainly we’re commercial, we can’t afford to be anything else. I don’t have the 
                                                                                                                                           
annual average of 2.6 cents per 10,000 cigarettes sold. By the end of the decade, the company reduced 
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right to spend the stockholder’s money just to entertain the public.”
171
 But the public 
was entertained, and continued tuning in- and buying Lucky Strikes- by the billion. 
Along with camouflaging Lucky Strike advertising with radio entertainment 
(whether the listeners detected it or not), Hill’s more successful shows all attempted 
to develop a national awareness in listeners. These were not programs for individual 
cities or regions. When listeners switched on their sets, they were transported to an 
aural world they knew was inhabited by the rest of the American public. And in this 
world, where performances from any corner of the country traveled instantly into 
living rooms in every town, Lucky Strike was the force that brought everything 
together. George Hill did not just co-opt existing strains of popular culture into his 
advertising. On the contrary, the shows that were sponsored by Lucky Strike created a 
listening audience that increasingly thought of itself as a national body. In each of 
these sponsored programs, popular culture and entertainment were presented to 
listeners in a conflation of advertising and national identity. The more these programs 
could appear to be American shows made for an American audience, the more these 
same American listeners would be inclined to buy Lucky Strike. 
 Using radio advertising to foster a stronger national identity was an explicit 
goal for George Hill and the other men at American Tobacco who created these 
shows. Hill was adamant about this national component, writing in 1943 that “we 
have been striving and are continuing to strive to increase our Crossley [ratings] and 
of course that means a bigger and broader [American] audience.”
172
 Since Lucky 
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Strike cigarettes were distributed nationally, potential customers who thought of 
themselves in national terms would be more likely to choose Lucky Strikes over local 
brands and other products that were not associated with America. Stronger national 
identity also meant Americans would be more receptive to advertising carried in 
national media, which was far more cost-efficient. Newspaper, billboards, and other 
localized advertising campaigns had to be adapted to local cultures and were not as 
effective outside of these smaller areas.
173
 Advertising targeted to local, diverse 
groups of Americans, Hill believed, was like a shotgun blast. Spread out across a 
wide area, local advertising became atomized and its overall effectiveness diluted. 
“We have our target- the audience. Our problem is to hit that target clean, and with 
terrific impact,” an ATC memorandum said, “you can’t do it with ‘shotgun fire,’ for 
that sprinkles power…for our purposes, we must look to an even more powerful 
weapon…”
174
 Hill advocated for concentrated national advertising campaigns that 
promoted and benefitted from a growing feeling of national identity among 
Americans. When customers felt in tune with mainstream national culture and the rest 
of the American people, it was easier for national advertising (carried in national 
media and enmeshed in mainstream popular culture) to resonate more broadly.  
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 Emphasizing feelings of national identity was a clear goal for George Hill and 
the American Tobacco Company, and the success of the Lucky Strike brand relied on 
the strength of widespread national identity. Since radio could instantly reach large 
groups of people and merge advertising and entertainment together, it was an 
effective medium to advertise and promote the growth of national consciousness that 
was developing in this period. American Tobacco was not the only company to 
advertise through radio programs designed for a national audience, but it did produce 
some of the most blatantly commercialized entertainment on the air and thus provides 
a unique perspective on the forces that promoted national identity for profit. 
175
  
How Americans developed a national identity is an important part of the 
history of the early 20
th
 century. Historians often attribute the erosion of exclusively 
local and regional views and shifts to a more nationally focused American culture to 
political and social forces. The expansion of the federal government as part of the 
New Deal, the movement of peoples during the Great Depression, common 
experiences during the Second World War, and the rise of mass communication and 
entertainment are frequently cited as the major factors that pushed Americans to think 
of themselves in more national terms. But it is important to also include advertisers 
and businessmen in the list of forces that contributed to a formation of national 
consciousness in the United States between the 1920s and 1940s. Products sold on a 
national scale benefitted from national advertising and national identity, so George 
Hill and others like him were invested in expanding mass radio communication and 
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mainstream American culture. Advertisers were important actors in the growth of 
national consciousness among the American population, even though their reasons for 
supporting such a society were driven more by profit than anything else.  The cultural 
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 Unlike any other kind of advertising, radio had no visual component. When a 
listener switched their radio on, they were greeted by a Habermasian combination of 
disembodied words, music, and sounds. As many observers and critics quickly 
noticed, though the sounds of radio were formless, they were still intrusive and often 
times actually harder to avoid than visual materials. Radio penetrated the home, 
bringing the outside world into the living room and the kitchen. Though magazines, 
newspapers, and other printed materials could also be carried into the home, a reader 
could turn the page or look away at any time. When the radio was switched on, its 
messages would always be heard regardless of whether the listener rejected them or 
not. This issue was particularly important when radio broadcasts began incorporating 
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advertising in the late 1920s. If a listener wanted to hear their favorite shows, they 
would have to accept the commercials and announcements that came with them 
too.
177
 Radio was also defined by time; it was not oriented spatially like physical print 
advertisements were. This meant that broadcasters only had a limited amount of time 
in which to expose listeners to their messages. The time aspect of radio would prove 
to be a major issue for advertisers transitioning from print, where a constant stream of 
messages designed to reach viewers was preferred. The old advertising adage that 
“repetition is reputation” would not have the same response from customers, as 
George Hill would quickly learn.
178
 Navigating the temporality and structured format 
of radio while trying to keep listeners tuned into the sales message proved 
challenging at times. Far from being passive listeners, radio audiences in the early 
decades of radio were willing to turn their sets off or even boycott a program and its 
sponsor if they were not satisfied with its content. 
179
 
 Radio quickly became recognized as a device that organized listeners into 
groups as it broadcast programs across the United States. As the technology quickly 
advanced after the first commercial broadcasts in 1920, radio speakers allowed people 
to hear broadcasts communally in their homes, and created a popular space for 
communal listening.
180
 In its first decade, radio was a small scale and routinely local 
form of entertainment. Broadcasting from one city or region to another required 
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powerful radio transmitters that independent stations could not afford, so most created 
shows with home-grown talent for neighborhood audiences. The first program 
sponsored by Lucky Strike, Nathan Glantz and His Men, was introduced in this 
period. First aired in 1923, the show was only heard in New York City where it was 
broadcast by one station, WEAF.
181
 But even though radio was initially a local form 
of entertainment, it still helped organize Americans and bridge the gap between local 
and mass American culture in the United States.
182
  
 The Nathan Glantz program, a music show, was canceled only a year later in 
early 1924. According to Glantz “advertising by radio does not pay,” and the 
expensive costs of maintaining an orchestra and buying radio time from WEAF 
seemed to outweigh any benefits.
183
 Sponsoring a local radio show allowed Lucky 
Strike to combine entertainment and sales messages, but did not help the brand foster 
a national consciousness. In order for radio advertising to be effective, it seemed that 
shows sponsoring Lucky Strike would need to be broadcast nationally, and would 
have to make this abundantly clear to listeners. George Hill, who was a still a junior 
level executive at the American Tobacco Company in 1924 was likely involved in the 
production of this first radio advertising campaign, and would not make the same 
mistakes years later when he funded nationally broadcast shows. It was important for 
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both the advertising and the entertainment portions of a sponsored show to be 
explicitly national. Missing this component was the reason why this early show did 
not produce dramatic results like later shows would. 
 Though it was initially a more localized form of entertainment, radio was 
quickly recognized by corporations and advertisers as a medium that could be adapted 
for a much larger audience. With their capital and national presence, the National 
Broadcasting Corporation and a few other large companies quickly came to dominate 
the entire industry within just a few years. While stations continued to carry some 
local programming; soap operas, musical variety shows, and a host of other nationally 
broadcast shows came to rule the airwaves by the early 1930s. The Radio Act of 1927 
consolidated the industry to these national broadcasters and shut down many of the 
local and independent stations that catered to exclusively local audiences.
184
 
According to one observer in 1935, radio “carries people away from localism and 
gives them direct access to the more popular stereotypes in the national life.” With a 
radio, even the most remote listener became part of a national listening audience.
185
  
 When listeners tuned into national broadcasts, they were often conscious that 
they were part of a larger American radio audience. By 1933, over half of the 
American population lived in homes with radios, far more than the previous decade. 
In 1940 well over 100 million Americans had access to radio programming in their 
homes.
186
  And broadcasters constantly reminded their listeners of this fact, creating a 
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picture of a “vast, unified, national” audience of which each listener was a part.
187
 
Franklin Roosevelt was one of these broadcasters, using his masterful fireside chats to 
give even the most remote listeners the sense that they were actually all sitting 
together with the president. In an era when large populations and geographic distance 
threatened to atomize and separate individuals, the intimate nature of radio created an 
illusion of unity that bonded Americans together. 
188
 
Imagination was a critical part of the listening experience, since radio had no 
real images with which listeners could connect. “Wireless without prejudice serves 
everything that implies dissemination and community of feeling” a 1936 critique of 
radio noted, “and works against separateness and isolation.”
189
  By constantly 
reminding listeners that they were part of a larger crowd, radio was able to construct 
an imagined national community. Listening to nationally broadcast programs fostered 
a sense of American identity.
190
 By associating Lucky Strike with these nationally 
broadcast programs, George Hill was able to blend his brand into mass American 
culture in a way that radio audiences understood. 
 Throughout Hill’s career, the majority of Lucky Strike advertising on the air 
came in the form of sponsored programming, a format that many businesses preferred 
in radio's first few decades. Instead of merely paying for commercial “spots” in 
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between network shows, sponsors actually created and produced the entire shows that 
went on the air. “The trouble with most spot announcements,” Hill said, “is that they 
do not offer the listener anything in return for having to listen to the commercial.”
191
 
The sponsored show gave advertisers a much longer period of time with the audience, 
allowing them to create much deeper connections between show, audience, and 
product. Using sponsored programming fit well with Hill’s controlling attitude 
towards advertising.  Here, he was able to manipulate the entertainment portion of the 
show and help it mesh with Lucky Strike sales messages, something that could not be 
done as easily in newspapers or magazines. Since sponsoring linked a brand’s 
reputation to the program’s reputation, it was important to create an atmosphere that 
would keep listeners’ attention and emphasize certain ideas and themes. This was a 
key difference from regular spot commercials or print advertising where a brand 
stood on its own, more or less. In the listener’s mind, the show and the brand were 
inseparable, and both needed to hold up to public scrutiny in order to succeed. In 
Hill’s ongoing quest to sell Lucky Strike as a national brand for all Americans, this 
link to national broadcasting would be crucial to its success. 
 Sponsoring radio programming instead of relying on commercial spots was a 
way for Hill and his advertisers to camouflage advertising within popular 
entertainment. When Americans were introduced to radio in the 1920s a majority of 
stations broadcast independently and listeners did not hear corporate advertising on 
their radios nearly as much as they would after NBC and the other national 
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corporations took control of the airwaves.
192
 Tying advertising and entertainment 
together in this way helped make sponsored programs more acceptable to a 
generation of listeners unfamiliar with commercialized broadcasting. The bleak 
atmosphere created by the Great Depression also produced a listening audience that 
was critical of advertising and its place in the American business system.
193
 Spot 
commercials were abrupt interruptions to the entertainment portions of broadcasts and 
could easily be skipped and ignored by listeners because they were played at separate 
times. It was much harder for a listener to avoid advertising if it was integrated into 
the same entertainment they had tuned to hear in the first place. Associating the 
Lucky Strike brand with popular broadcasting entertainment also helped generate a 
feeling of good will towards the sponsor. “If I did not already smoke your cigarettes I 
certainly would do so merely as a slight appreciation of the pleasure I have had 
through listening to the weekly programs of the Lucky Strike Orchestra,” one faithful 
listener wrote in 1931. “It is my earnest hope that the orchestra will continue on the 
air as long as Luckies are on the market.”
194
 Listeners understood that without the 
sponsor’s support, their favorite shows would not be on the air. 
 Despite any good will that Your Hit Parade and the rest of Lucky Strike’s 
programs generated, they still contained implicit and explicit advertising that any 
listener could detect. Advertising on the radio could not be skipped over and was not 
easily ignored like print advertisements in magazines or newspapers. Though listeners 
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always had the choice of turning the radio off, this would also result in the loss of the 
entertainment they were listening for in the first place. Film, theater, and other older 
forms of leisure and entertainment were not as manifestly commercial as radio was, 
and the interruptions that kept audiences from their shows became a common 
complaint. Going as far as calling one Lucky Strike show an “excellent dance 
orchestra which punctuates the advertising announcements broadcast by the Lucky 
Strike people,” one critic claimed that listeners “have become so hardened to the 
blatant advertising…they automatically become deaf when the announcer’s voice 
starts.”
195
 The advertising that the Lucky Strike Radio Hour became well known for 
likely did drive some listeners to ignore sales messages or even seek out other 
entertainments. This criticism was common on all programs produced under George 
Hill’s direction. “As a representative of this clan [of listeners], I wish to say that Kay 
Kyser’s Musical Kollege is one fine hour of entertainment,” wrote Althea Bruwer, a 
listener from Virginia, “the faulty moments are the ramblings of the [announcer]. 
When this advertising stunt was first started, it was a novelty but now it is becoming 
monotonous.” But ignoring this advertising was not as easy as listeners may have 
thought. Although Bruwer did admit that she grew tired of the commercial 
announcements on the show, she also identified herself as one of “millions” who 
listened to the show.
 196
 In her letter to the editor of Radio Mirror, she assumes there 
were fans of the show in every corner of the United States, and that they all knew 
who sponsored the show. This type of comment was common. Radio magazines often 
published fan letters from listeners, and when a Lucky Strike show was discussed 
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writers frequently identified themselves as one of many listeners. Regardless of any 
irritation Hill’s shows may have caused, their audiences were conscious of their 
national identity on some level. And by sponsoring these shows, Lucky Strike stood 
to benefit from the association between the brand and mainstream American society. 
 From the beginning of his tenure as president of American Tobacco, George 
Hill was the driving force behind radio advertising. In the late 1920s when 
commercial radio emerged on the national networks, most large advertising agencies 
did not immediately see its potential as a major advertising platform. Albert Lasker, 
president of the Lord & Thomas advertising agency and the creative force behind 
many Lucky Strike campaigns, was not convinced of the usefulness of radio 
advertising until many years later. Lasker considered Hill’s first program, the Lucky 
Strike Radio Hour, to be more of a “vanity piece” than an effective form of 
advertising. This opinion echoes many others in the early years of radio, who 
believed that radio advertising could only generate “good-will” from the audience and 
nothing more.
197
 Hill would later respond to this approach, remarking that an agency 
that only utilizes radio for its good-will “does not know the reason for sales, and has 
not the intelligence enough to find the sales reason that will induce the public to buy 
your goods.”
198
 Though Hill did receive creative and technical support from Lasker 
and his agency, his willingness to use radio as a serious platform for advertising was 
unique. 
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 Along with his willingness to divert a significant portion of his advertising 
budget to radio, Hill was often personally involved in the rehearsals and 
performances of broadcasts. In the studio, Hill’s decisions were final. If a program 
did not sound right to him for any reason it would be immediately changed. “A switch 
is turned…All listen and look at Hill. Hill just listens. From time to time a member of 
the [American Tobacco] committee will get up and dance to some of the numbers to 
check the orchestra’s tempo and viability.” This account of a practice for the Lucky 
Strike Radio Hour is typical of Hill’s personal involvement in the process. “Too 
blue,’ snap[ped] Hill. ‘I don’t like those pianos. Make that rhythm snappier. Put more 
pep in it.”
199
 Hill was reported to have had a radio playing in every room of his 
Hudson River mansion when he went home in the evening, so that he could monitor 
every second of his shows as they broadcast. If an announcer so much as emphasized 
the wrong part of the word Lucky Strike, the station could immediately expect an 




Perhaps Hill oversaw the production of these radio shows because he valued 
radio differently than many of his contemporaries. He did not trust advertising and 
broadcast executives to generate programs that would effectively sell his beloved 
cigarettes in an effective manner. But, as much as he tried Hill could not be 
personally involved in each broadcast so he also distributed a number of workbooks, 
memorandums, and other documents to his employees in which he laid out the 
principles on which Lucky Strike radio advertising was based. “Radio,” he contended, 
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“is in fact ‘salesmanship-in-person.’”
201
 Hill had realized radio could create an 
intimate atmosphere between the advertiser and the listener in his home, though he 
preferred to create a noisy dancehall instead of a quiet fireside.
202
 In the 1920s and 
1930s, many Americans felt threatened and anxious about the spread of mass 
American culture into their lives. The rise of a national consciousness was not met 
favorably in many homes. But, radio’s personal tone was ideally suited to promote 
national identity in a positive way that was met with less hostility than other 
centralizing forces at the time.
203
 Like personalities such as Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Father Coughlin, George Hill also used radio to emphasize and support feelings of 
national identity with broadcasts that appealed to millions of Americans. When Hill 
began advertising on the radio in earnest in 1928 he would quickly create a personal 
space where listeners were encouraged to buy Lucky Strike cigarettes and think of 
themselves in national terms, two different ideas that were blended together into a 
single concept on the air.  
 The Lucky Strike Radio Hour, sometimes called the Lucky Strike Dance Hour, 
began each week’s broadcast at 10pm Saturday night. Each show began with a 
performance of “This is My Lucky Day,” a song that reveals much about the kind of 
atmosphere George Hill wanted to associate with Lucky Strike. Originally written for 
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Broadway’s George White Scandals of 1926, the theme song of the Lucky Strike 
Radio Hour was a well-known tune that had been popularized and distributed 
nationally via most major recording labels and sheet music companies.
204
 Indirectly 
advertising the sponsoring brand by repeating the word “lucky” dozens of times, this 
theme song began the hour immediately connecting the night’s entertainment, 
Broadway, and the Lucky Strike brand together in a single musical statement.
205
 At 
the conclusion of this first song, an announcer’s voice came over the airwaves, 
welcoming the audience to the show and setting the mood for the rest of the hour’s 
entertainment. “Good evening, my friends. And so begins this hour of dance music 
presented for your pleasure by the manufactures of Lucky Strike Cigarettes.”  This 
verbally reinforced the musical message that listeners had heard only moments 
before, highlighting the sponsoring brand in an unambiguous manner that did not 
leave listeners guessing from where their entertainment came. “B.A. Rolfe and his 
Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra will be heard in the tunes that made Broadway, 
Broadway. Should you sit out a dance, it is suggested: Reach for a Lucky.” Following 
this short introduction, the announcer would name the next song or two that would be 
played, and the orchestra would begin.
206
  
                                                 
204
 Before The Lucky Strike Radio Hour adopted the song, a version of the song was recorded 
by the star vocal group The Revelers and produced by the Victor Talking Machine Company. 
Katherine Spring, Saying It With Songs: Popular Music and the Coming of Sound to Hollywood 
Cinema. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23. 
 
205
 Later on, the song “Happy Days are Here Again” replaced “It’s My Lucky Day” as the 
show’s theme song. While the song did not mention the word “lucky” anywhere, it was still effective 
in equating the show and sponsor with national American culture. Written and first featured in the 
1930 film Chasing Rainbows, it was later used as Franklin Roosevelt’s 1932 presidential campaign 
song, and was well throughout the country.  
 
206
 Radio Continuity, Lucky Strike Radio Hour, Broadcast Script, Tobacco Documents Online. 
May 4, 1929, 1.  
Though the opening was brief, it articulated to the listener the basic elements 
of the Lucky Strike Radio Hour. First that the musical and verbal components of the 
broadcast were to mirror each other. The same feelings and emotions that were 
assigned to the show’s musical entertainment were also intended to also be linked to 
spoken descriptions of Lucky Strike in the listener’s mind. Second, the announcer 
directly mentioned the Lucky Strike brand in the same sentences about dance music 
and Broadway, insinuating that without Lucky Strike this entertainment would not be 
possible. Having the Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra, a representation of the cigarette 
brand in the shape of men and instruments, was a way to blend Lucky Strike and 
national popular culture together into one program that was not quite an advertising 
message or pure entertainment. Neither part existed without the other on the show, 
and every time the announcer spoke for the rest of the night he would always mention 
the name “Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” before he introduced the next song. The 
announcer’s opening also made it quite clear that this was a dance program, not an 
hour of opera or light music. No, the Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra only played 
popular music with an up-beat rhythm and tempo. Though each of these messages 
would be reinforced throughout the rest of the program, their explicit inclusion at the 
beginning of the Lucky Strike Radio Hour helped create an environment designed to 
promote Lucky Strike as a popular national brand for an American audience.  
Just as the announcer told radio listeners, Hill insisted that the songs played on 
the Lucky Strike Radio Hour played “tunes that made Broadway, Broadway.”
207
 
Though which songs were played each week was always in flux, they always had to 
meet this standard; it was a central part of the musical formula for the show. “Not the 
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songs that are making Broadway Broadway,” a company memo insisted, “but the 
songs that made Broadway Broadway.” Hill believed that “people like to hear things 
their ears are attuned to, not new numbers. Songs that have so rung in the public ear 
that they mean something, recall something, start with a background of pleasant 
familiarity.”
208
 Music that already was a recognizable part of a national popular 
culture was what a national listening audience wanted to hear, and only very rarely 
did song selections include new or unknown numbers.  
Unlike Your Hit Parade’s (the Lucky Strike Radio Hour’s successor) weekly 
surveys of music sales, it is not clear exactly who chose the songs in each week’s 
program. It may have been Hill and other executives from American Tobacco, or 
could likely have been either employees of Lord & Thomas or N.B.C. Regardless, 
these songs always adhered to the “popular song” formula. An examination of the 
continuity scripts from 1928 and 1929 reveal that the Lucky Strike Radio Hour 
emphasized tunes published by large, nationally known firms from Tin Pan Alley, the 
dominant force in popular American music at the time. These songs had already been 
distributed and well-received nationally and were often established hits and had 
connections to Broadway or early sound films. It was uncommon for songs 
copyrighted by lesser known music companies to be featured on the show.
209
  
When songs were played by Lucky Strike conductor B.A. Rolfe and the 
orchestra, they were arranged in a manner that kept them recognizable to a national 
listening audience. In an era where listeners cared more about the actual song than 
any particular artist’s rendition, it was common for arrangers to modify a tune and 
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insert their own unique personality into it. This was, however, not the case on the 
Lucky Strike Radio Hour. Hill liked to call it music “a la Rolfe, served hot without 
any dressing.” What this meant was that song introductions would be skipped and 
replaced with repetitions of more recognizable choruses. Songs would also be played 
to the “characteristic Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra tempo, which is lively, rather 
fast, and is an essential characteristic of the program.” Any sort of “frills and 
furbelows”- extravagant or unexpected alterations to the song- were not allowed.
210
 
Maintaining the popular version of the song helped the Lucky Strike brand align itself 
with an already proven, acceptable form of national culture. 
Since the Lucky Strike Radio Hour was a music show, the majority of the 
hour’s content was made up of between fifteen and eighteen songs. There were only 
two sources of dialogue- the anonymous announcer and occasionally Rolfe or the 
other conductors who came to replace him over the years. Dialogue was subordinated 
to music on the show.
211
 But, listeners never forgot that there was also a commercial 
component to the show as well. Counting the opening, there were at least four copy 
announcements in each week’s broadcast, each of which promoted Lucky Strike in a 
variety of different ways. Typically, a program would have two sixty second 
advertising announcements, which would be played about twenty and thirty five 
minutes into the show. Originally these longer spots featured celebrity testimonials, 
but were switched to repeat current newspaper and magazine copy themes as 
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endorsements fell out of favor in American advertising.
212
 Regardless, both of these 
advertising techniques served to connect the radio to print advertising campaigns.  
When these commercial spots borrowed from concurrent print campaigns, 
they also took the same ideas about gender, class, and national identity that 
Americans would have seen in Lucky Strike ads in magazines and newspapers. In the 
late 1920s and first years of the 1930s, Lucky Strike advertisements often linked the 
product with a higher class lifestyle. And along with these print ads that promoted 
financial comfort and featured opera stars and other refined figures, radio audiences 
could expect to hear testimonials from socialites like Marjorie Oelrichs. “Since Lucky 
Strike is my favorite cigarette, it is the only one I serve to my friends,” she claimed in 
1928, “it is surprising to note how many of them prefer Luckies to all other 
cigarettes.”
213
 No doubt these friends were also upper class, suggesting that Lucky 
Strike was the brand for the socio-economic elite. Beginning in 1927, Lucky Strike 
began directly targeting women in its print advertisements. Though women were 
smoking in increasing numbers by the end of the 1920s, it was still stigmatized and 
they were often prevented from smoking in public. In order to reverse this taboo and 
encourage women to buy and use cigarettes more frequently, George Hill pushed a 
series of campaigns targeting women in a variety of ways; most notably by 
advertising that Lucky Strike would help maintain a slender figure. The modern 
woman of the 1920s and 1930s, liberated from conventional gender roles and more 
publically active, would need Lucky Strike to help her stay thin and beautiful. Rosalie 
Nelson, the poster girl for Lucky Strike and symbol of the modern all-American 
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woman, reported in a 1928 broadcast that “I’m a lucky girl because I’ve found a new 
way to keep my figure trim. Whenever the desire for a sweet tempts me, I light up a 
Lucky Strike.”
214
 Lucky Strike targeted men just as much as women in their 
advertising, promoting the cigarette as part of active athletic lifestyles too. George 
Hill wanted to sell to a universal American audience. The message was clear: buying 
a pack of Luckies was more than just buying cigarettes; it was a symbol that a 
consumer could use to prove they were part of a national modern American society.  
Constructing gender and social identity through Lucky Strike was not limited 
to the explicit advertising portion of the show. George Hill designed the Lucky Strike 
Radio Hour to mesh advertising and entertainment into an inseparable combination, 
and themes that were explicitly stated in commercial spots were also expressed 
through the musical content of the show. To mirror the high-class airs of the program, 
the songs played by B.A. Rolfe were often designated as waltzes or tangos by the 
announcer, instead of dances with lower-class distinctions. Dance music was a form 
of entertainment that both men and women enjoyed, a fact that radio studies from the 
period often noted. Unlike sports programs or soap operas that appealed more to men 
or women, dance music held a broader appeal to both.
215
 Dancing also promoted the 
same fit and healthy lifestyle seen in Lucky Strike ads. Having this continuity 
between print campaigns, in-show advertising messages, and the entertainment 
portion of the program allowed the Lucky Strike Radio Hour to promote Lucky Strike 
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explicitly or implicitly for the entire show, even though the announcer only spoke for 
a fraction of the total time. 
Connections to gender and class on the air would differ over the years just like 
contemporary print ads. In some broadcasts, advertising themes would target men 
more directly than women and vice versa. After the first few years of the Great 
Depression, explicit references to refined upper class individuals waned as the 
American public settled into economic hard times. However, the idea of a national 
listening audience was always stressed in both copy and music. Always addressing 
the audience as a crowd, the announcer often directly referred to listeners as the men 
or the women “of America” and called Lucky Strike the “choice of millions” of 
Americans. Between this identification of a national audience and the continual play 
of songs chosen for their national appeal, Hill was able to create an expressly 
American environment on the air, devoid of any regional differences. And as the 
sponsor of the broadcasts, Lucky Strike became both a creator and indelible piece of 
this nationalism. 
In her study of Chicago in the late 1920s and 1930s, Lizabeth Cohen has 
argued that many Americans thought of themselves more in local and ethnic terms 
than as a national American group. Especially among first and second generation 
American families, personal identities were generally not regarded in national terms. 
Beginning in the late 1920s, however, younger people increasingly began using 
mainstream popular culture to bridge the gap between their old-world parents and 
national American society. Though they still consciously kept their local identities as 
Jews, Italians, or Poles, radio shows like the Lucky Strike Radio Hour helped 
working-class youths become more American.
216
 Though this inclusion in national 
American society was not the only identity these local groups had, radio still helped 
erode rigid regional cultures and open access into an audience that was aware of its 
national character. And among younger Americans, the Lucky Strike Radio Hour was 
the most popular show on the air. In a 1932 survey, high school aged boys and girls 
both overwhelmingly chose the Lucky Strike broadcast as their favorite program.
217
 
While they may not have smoked at the time, young people participating in 
mainstream popular culture to feel more American did prefer to listen to the Lucky 
Strike Radio Hour. When this generation came of age a few years later, many of them 
would buy the cigarettes that had sponsored national entertainment, Lucky Strike. 
Though they did make up a majority of the listening audience, younger 
crowds were not the only ones listening to the Lucky Strike Radio Hour.
218
 Millions 
of older Americans across the country also tuned in Saturday nights to hear the 
week’s dance numbers. The program was carried by the NBC Red Network, and 
broadcast on between forty and fifty stations each year.
219
 The Red Network was 
broadcast nationally, and had stations in major cities across the United States. 
Ultimately, the success that Lucky Strike found in their first popular music show did 
not last. The initially high ratings that the show received in 1928 gradually declined 
as the dance craze of the 1920s subsided in favor of ballads and other types of songs. 
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By 1933 it seemed that Lucky Strike was not in tune with the American people and 
their taste in music. Along with this widening gap between the program’s music and 
the national favorites, the show’s regular commercial spots and promotions for Lucky 
Strike also drove listeners away. “I, like many other listeners, am sick tired and 
disgusted by the amount of disgusting and puerile hooey of advertising I must listen 
to in order to hear snatches and ragged ends of splendid programs,” one Ohio listener 
wrote in 1933, the show’s final year.
220
 It seemed listeners were willing to stand radio 
advertising as long as the entertainment portion of the show was still acceptable. As 
the Lucky Strike Radio Hour’s ratings dropped and listeners remained hostile to the 
ads the show, it was quietly taken off the air.
221
  
The end of the Lucky Strike Radio Hour was not the end of George Hill’s 
experience with radio advertising. Taking the lessons learned from his first nationally 
broadcast show, Hill returned Lucky Strike to the airwaves a year later on a new 
program that did play the nation’s favorite songs. And this time Hill made sure the 
audience knew it. 
It was clear that the underlying formulas Hill developed for the Lucky Strike 
Radio Hour were successful in generating a large national audience and connecting 
mainstream popular culture with the Lucky Strike brand. Reacting to changes in 
national taste and sustaining this audience was trickier. Together with advertisers and 
writers at Lord & Thomas, Hill devised a formula for a new music show that would 
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be able to react to changes in audience favorites and make listeners feel more engaged 
in the program. The result was Your Hit Parade, a broadcast so successful that it 
would remain on the air for twenty-four years, long after George Hill died in 1946. 
The show was Lucky Strike’s most enduring legacy in American culture and one of 
the clearest examples of how the ATC utilized radio to promote national identity. 
When it was first aired in April 1935, Your Hit Parade used a “scientific” 
system that made the program’s music appear to be an authentic selection of the 
nation’s favorite songs that particular week.  According to reminders on the show and 
articles published in fan magazines and newspapers, each week’s songs were selected 
using a “fool-proof” system that determined the current national favorites. A staff of 
over fifty analysts was kept at American Tobacco who tabulated reports from “band 
leaders, songs most played on the radio and in the juke boxes, and a survey of sales in 
sheet music and phonograph records.” Whichever songs were requested or bought 
more would be determined and arranged for that week’s broadcast.
222
 A sense of 
mystery surrounded the week’s song selections, which were reportedly transported 
from the American Tobacco building to the recording studio in an armored car. No 
one knew which songs were the winners for the week until they played on the air.
223
 
Reports of listeners getting together at Hit Parade parties each Saturday night and 
betting on the week’s top songs were common.
224
  
                                                 
              
222
 Radio Continuity, Your Hit Parade, February 22, 1941, 125; also see, “Tune-In Bulletin for 
April 29, May 6, 13, and 20!” Radio Mirror, June 1939. 52.  
 
223
 Even the Hit Parade’s performers were kept from the secretive song list. While on a visit to 
the White House, Hit Parade singer Frank Sinatra was asked by Franklin D. Roosevelt what the week’s 
number one song was. Not knowing himself, he was unable to answer the disappointed president. Cox, 
327.   
 
224
 “Tune-In Bulletin for April 29, May 6, 13, and 20!” Radio Mirror, June 1939, 52. 
 105 
 
Perhaps the most important innovation on the show was the song countdown, 
a technique that has revolutionized the broadcast music format and is still in use 
today. The Hit Paraders Orchestra would begin the hour by playing the eighth, ninth, 
and tenth most popular songs of the week. Building suspense and excitement as they 
got closer to the bottom of their list, the orchestra would not play the number one 
song until the end of the show.
225
 Playing the week’s selections in this order was a 
way to keep audiences tuned in and excited for the duration of the program. And the 
more listeners got excited and paid attention to the show the better for Hill, who 
imbedded sales messages for Lucky Strike cigarettes frequently in between songs. A 
typical episode of Your Hit Parade referred to the Lucky Strike brand about twenty 
times, or an average of once about every three minutes. Though Your Hit Parade was 
every bit as commercial as the Lucky Strike Radio Hour, audiences were more willing 
to put up with and listen to advertising because of the excitement generated by the 
music and its performance. 
 Your Hit Parade was not just a music program; it was an exciting national 
competition and a weekly lens into which listeners could see what Americans all 
across the country were listening to. With the suspense of a contest and the certainty 
of statistics, Your Hit Parade helped listeners feel they were directly involved in the 
song selection process. The show’s title, emphasizing the word “Your,” reflected the 
populist rhetoric and national themes surrounding the program. Listening to the show, 
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Lawrence Levine has argued the shows Americans liked and “elevated to 
prominence” in the 1930s and 1940s were ones that adhered to formulaic structures 
yet also had ample room for surprise. When Your Hit Parade came on the radio, 
listeners could always expect a level of comfort and certainty and yet a fair amount of 
variation and excitement every time.
227
 That Americans chose to listen to Your Hit 
Parade in far greater numbers than many other products of popular culture available 
in this period shows how this commercial radio broadcast with explicit nationalist 
language was well received by audiences. 
References to the United States and a national American audience were even 
more explicit than the advertising messages spoken in each episode of Your Hit 
Parade. The announcer’s dialogue was similar to what listeners heard on the Lucky 
Strike Radio Hour, but instead of focusing on Broadway and the songs that Tin Pan 
Alley and the major song producers promoted, listeners were told that song selections 
came directly from the American people. At the same time, Your Hit Parade did not 
lose sight of local differences in music either. Even if a song was not the nation’s 
number one choice any particular week, it often was the most popular song in at least 
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one city or region. One example of this was the song “I’m Sitting High on a Hilltop” 
which ranked tenth one week in 1936. According to the announcer, “it has a specially 
loyal following at Annapolis where it’s the hit of this week.”
228
 The names of cities 
and other local areas were mentioned constantly by the announcer, reminding 
listeners that no matter where they were or what songs they liked, they were still part 
of a national listening audience that was made up of many different places that were 
all part of the same United States.
229
 Here, on Your Hit Parade, Lucky Strike 
provided listeners with a way to personally participate in cultivating a nationalist 
ethos with millions of other Americans through mainstream popular culture. 
The performances on Your Hit Parade were designed by the ATC to erase any 
indications of racial or ethnic diversity in music and audiences. Belief in a unified 
mass audience meant that broadcasts should not recognize regional, ethnic, or cultural 
differences in listeners. When a song was played on the show, the Hit Parade 
Orchestra was told that “melody should always stand out. Rhythm and bass should be 
emphasized.” Hill imagined songs that inspired every listener to get out of their chair 
and dance: “accent the tempo; give it plenty of sparkle and shoulder shake.
 230
 The 
original genre or cultural flavor that a song may have had when it was originally 
written was ironed out for performance on Your Hit Parade just as other Lucky Strike 
ads excluded non-white groups from their visions of modernity and mass society. 
Variation risked losing potential listeners, and by extension, potential customers and 
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profits. Musicians were told that “the stringent rule is…that the music must be played 
simply and clearly so that the tune is easily recognized.”
231
 According to some 
accounts, Hill’s insistence that every musician conform to this strict performance 
standard caused irritated Frank Sinatra so much that he quit the show.
232
 
Americans across the country responded positively to the nationalist and 
populist themes on Your Hit Parade as evidenced by the consistently high ratings the 
show received. In the show’s debut year, an average of 13.3 percent of the 22.5 
million American homes with radios were tuned into Your Hit Parade each week. In 
the following years, as the percentage of all American homes with radios steadily 
increased, an even larger proportion of radios were tuned into to the show. As more 
Americans came into regular contact with radio, they were also listening to Your Hit 
Parade in greater numbers as well. At the same time, the major radio networks were 
rapidly expanding in the late 1930s, bringing national radio programs to an 
increasingly large geographical area. What was a string of stations concentrated on 
the east coast near New York and Chicago in 1930 became a dense national network 
that reached out into rural areas previously isolated from distant urban centers by the 
start of World War II.
233
  
By the early 1940s, close to 6 million homes, or sixteen percent of total 
American households, kept coming back to Your Hit Parade and the accompanying 
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 Since Americans often listened to the radio in groups and 
not individually, it is likely that a far greater portion of the population was actually 
listening to Your Hit Parade than these numbers indicate. Either way, it is clear that 
as Americans became more integrated into a national listening audience connected by 
popular culture and radio they turned to Your Hit Parade as a way to connect with the 
rest of the country. By integrating advertising into this national entertainment, George 
Hill was able to associate the same themes and values with Lucky Strike as well. 
Though regular commercial spots frequented Your Hit Parade, they were not 
the only piece of the advertising component that the American Tobacco Company and 
Lord & Thomas built into the broadcast. A number of slogans were introduced and 
repeated frequently by the announcer. This was not a new development for Your Hit 
Parade, as the Lucky Strike Radio Hour made use of the slogan “Its toasted” that was 
used in Lucky Strike print ads as far back as 1917. But on Your Hit Parade, slogans 
and other attention-grabbing sound devices became much more commonplace. “It’s 
Luckies 2 to 1,” “A Light Smoke,” and “L.S.M.F.T./Lucky Strike Means Fine 
Tobacco” were among the phrases that listeners could count on hearing multiple 
times each broadcast. Though many listeners complained that these slogans were too 
annoying, Hill’s slogans and other on-air gimmicks became, according to one 
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historian, “part of American folklore.”
235
 Regardless of any irritation they may have 
caused, Lucky Strike slogans still managed to stick in the minds of listeners. 
It is impossible to say exactly how the radio programs sponsored by Lucky 
Strike cigarettes affected Americans. Radio audiences were by no means passive 
listeners, and did not simply accept messages that broadcasters and advertisers aimed 
at them. Determining how a listener responded to an episode of Your Hit Parade in 
1941 or whether listening to the Lucky Strike Radio Hour helped a listener become 
more nationally conscious in 1929 is difficult, since listeners could often interpret the 
same message in dramatically different ways. But, it seems that George Hill and the 
American Tobacco Company believed in the power of radio advertising and its ability 
to make the American population think of itself in more national terms than it had 
before. A nationally-conscious community of potential customers was much easier to 
sell cigarettes to than separated regions with their own peculiarities and unique 
characteristics. The more uniform Americans were in their tastes and likes, the easier 
it would be for Lucky Strike cigarettes to sell nationally. Any method that would help 
in this way was worth its weight in gold to a company like American Tobacco. The 
amount of resources the company put into radio advertising reveals that it recognized 
the value in national identity and worked to contribute to this consciousness. 
The ATC was the first cigarette manufacturer to sponsor nationally broadcast 
radio programs; it took years for Lucky Strike’s rivals to finally create a significant 
presence for themselves on the air. Camel and Chesterfield cigarettes sponsored a 
string of minor shows in the 1930s, but they never received consistently high ratings 
like the Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra or Your Hit Parade. Even when Lucky Strike 
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was one of six major cigarette manufacturers on the air in the late 1930s and 1940s, 
its shows had the highest annual ratings.
236
  
“Radio has produced results for the American Tobacco Co. ever since we 
started to use it back in 1927…” an ATC executive declared in a 1941 interview, 
“we’re satisfied that radio is producing results for us because we can see it in our 
increased business.”
237
   Hill was an early believer in radio’s commercial potential, 
and he spent the rest of his career exploring the medium and using it to sell his 
beloved Lucky Strikes. And it seems that his faith was rewarded. Hill steadily 
increased spending on radio advertising throughout his presidency at American 
Tobacco. In 1928, the year that the Lucky Strike Radio Hour debuted, annual 
spending on radio amounted to slightly under $150,000, a fraction of the total Lucky 
Strike advertising budget. Ten years later, American Tobacco spent over sixteen 
times that amount on Your Hit Parade and seven other radio programs that reached a 
far greater proportion of the American people. At this point radio was the largest part 
of American Tobacco’s advertising strategy, costing the company far more than their 
newspaper or magazine campaigns.
238
 
If Hill’s decision to spend so much time and resources advertising on radio is 
a sign of his explicit attempts to foster national consciousness and associate it with a 
brand, then perhaps the sales of Lucky Strike can reveal how Americans responded to 
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this radio advertising. As spending on radio advertising increased, so did Lucky 
Strike sales. After 1928, consumption of the cigarettes increased by about 8 billion 
units to 44.6 billion in 1931, only three years after the Lucky Strike Radio Hour 
debuted. Throughout the 1930s, sales of Lucky Strike remained much more stable 
than any of their competitors. Despite a major decrease in the purchasing power of 
the American citizen during the Great Depression, Lucky Strike sales remained 
higher and much more stable than any other brand on the market.
239
  
In 1946, the advertising trade journal Printer’s Ink reported that 103.5 billion 
Lucky Strike cigarettes were sold that year, putting the brand 15 billion units over its 
nearest competitor.
 240
 In a sense, this statistic was to be George Hill’s epitaph. That 
year, after twenty years as president of the American Tobacco Company, Hill died of 
heart trouble, leaving a large void in the tobacco and advertising industries. Hill’s 
impact in American society is as large and as complicated as the radio campaigns he 
developed during his career. By the time of his death, Americans were smoking over 
300 billion cigarettes annually, and over one third of them were Lucky Strikes.
241
 But 
Hill’s legacy goes much further than the tobacco industry. Any account of popular 
American culture from the Depression and Second World War is incomplete without 
radio. The Lucky Strike Radio Hour, Your Hit Parade, Kay Kyser, Jack Benny, and 
the myriad other programs that were created, produced, and distributed using Lucky 
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Strike advertising dollars became part and parcel of national American identity in this 
period, and in turn contributed to feelings of national consciousness. 
Chapter 4: The Smoke of War: The Collapse of Unity within 
Lucky Strike Advertising, 1940-1946 
For Bill Storr, the Second World War did not begin on December 7
th
, 1942. 
Writing more than forty years later the South Carolina veteran could not recall the 
exact day that the war began for him, only that it was a “shocker, an event that will 
forever remain etched in my mind.” Storr’s first direct encounter with war was the 
day he could not buy Lucky Strike cigarettes. “Egad! It was one thing to put up with 
sugar rationing and no auto tires and pants with no cuffs. But this brought the conflict 
much too close to home,” he lamented, “It was like losing an old friend.”
242
 The loss 
of America’s most popular cigarette was a heavy blow to consumers who had been 
buying them by the billions before the war.  
Cigarette shortages were reported by many Americans to have taken a major 
toll on consumers for the duration of the war. In 1940, tobacco manufacturers 
produced enough for every American citizen to have four cigarettes daily. Three 
years later, so many cigarettes were being sent to troops overseas that one New York 
Times reporter warned Americans to prepare themselves for an average of two and 
two fifths cigarettes per day. “One can imagine what will happen then,” he wrote. A 
nation of cigarette smokers would be in a state of crisis and it would be common to 
see “well-dressed ladies and gentlemen…picking up butts in the street.”
243
 Many 
stores required customers to turn in empty cigarette packages before they could buy a 
new one to discourage hoarding. It was common for crowds to line up by the 
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thousands for a chance to buy their favorite brands on the rare occasions when 
retailers could put them on their shelves. The New York Times even reported that 
thieves would take cigarettes from their victims, a much more valuable commodity 
than the contents of their wallets. Storr followed Lucky Strike overseas to war, 
enlisting shortly after he was unable to purchase them in the United States. 
“Obviously, the situation was critical,” he recalled, “if waging war required the 
presence of Lucky Strike… then every able-bodied man and boy, and a few girls, 
must also be needed.”
244
 But for the millions of Americans who remained at home for 
the duration of the war, the loss of their cigarettes was a crisis many were not 
prepared for. 
Although the armed forces took billions of cigarettes off Americans shelves 
and sent them out of the country, Americans actually smoked much more during the 
war years than they ever had before. By the war’s end in 1945, per capita cigarette 
consumption increased by nearly a third to 2,027 smoked annually compared to just 
1,551 just five years earlier.
245
  And although tobacco was declared “essential” to the 
war effort, it was never rationed by the federal government. Instead, President 
Roosevelt deferred tobacco farmers and factory workers from the draft and 
encouraged the industry to meet burgeoning demand.
246
 Cigarette production in the 
United States increased by nearly fifty percent, but domestic cigarette shortages were 
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still caused by an insatiable consumer demand that outstripped the increases in 
production that were achieved.
247
  
Overseas, government policy ensured cigarettes were always available to 
soldiers, opening a new market for manufacturers. Companies like American Tobacco 
rushed to capture a piece of this new business as they had during World War I, fully 
aware of the potential profits and exposure to new consumers. Military purchases of 
cigarettes were tax-exempt, meaning that manufacturers could cut prices and still 
make a handsome profit on American soldiers. Major firms also took advantage of 
federal policies and cheap military prices in order to encourage brand loyalty, hoping 
that soldiers would not forget what they smoked when they returned home after the 
war. Cigarettes became an indelible part of the soldiers experience overseas. They 
were included in ration packs and servicemen could always could on cheap (or 
oftentimes free) cigarettes to smoke or barter with. Military camps in France were 
even named after popular cigarette brands. Camp Lucky Strike, located in Northern 
France, ironically had a large hospital complex for soldiers and prisoners of war. By 
the war’s end, military sales claimed about twenty five percent of total cigarette 
production in the United States.
248
 
The vast majority of cigarettes the War Department bought were made up of 
just a few leading brands; soldiers insisted on having the same Lucky Strikes, 
Camels, and Chesterfields they had smoked at home. “There was little else in the 
daily grind,” one historian wrote of popular brand cigarettes, “to remind [soldiers] of 
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 Without Lucky Strikes and other leading brands, civilians were sometimes 
left with off-brands and “war babies-” start up brands introduced during the war, both 
of which were sold at significantly lower prices.
250
 The cigarette crisis that Storr and 
millions of fellow Americans felt was caused more by themselves than by the war. 
Had Americans’ cigarette demand not risen so dramatically or if they had been 
content to smoke any brand, shortages would have been much less severe. 
Nonetheless, Americans always bought Lucky Strikes and other popular brands when 
they had the option, even if other brands were cheaper or easier to obtain.  
 The American Tobacco Company watched these changing smoking habits 
with a close eye and quickly realized that the war was changing how cigarettes were 
advertised and sold. The impact of war overseas and on the home front created a 
breakdown in the unity that had led ATC advertising policy since George Hill’s 
inauguration in 1926. With new consumption patterns, the ATC was given a new 
challenge- creating demand for a product that was hard or even impossible to find in 
stores. The unified advertising campaigns that had led Lucky Strike to the top of the 
cigarette market and through the Depression were confronted by new ideas on the 
best ways to advertise in wartime. As unity between print, radio, and other mediums 
of advertising unraveled, Lucky Strike ads began targeting Americans in 
fundamentally different ways. Conflicting messages and themes in advertising sent 
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consumers different messages about the war and the role that Lucky Strike was to 
play in it. 
 In the years leading up to American entry into World War II, George Hill 
watched from his Fifth Avenue office as sales of Lucky Strike were steadily 
surpassed by rival brands. Though sales of Luckies remained fairly stable in the late 
1930s, Camel and Chesterfield sales rose steadily and were selling billions more units 
annually. Lucky Strike advertising had mellowed and lost the edge it had in the 
beginning of the decade, when sensational campaigns and new strategies had kept the 
brand far atop the sales charts. Nothing but first place in cigarette sales was good 
enough for Hill, and so in 1940 he finally turned to a new advertising strategy- 
industrial design. Changing the physical appearance of the Lucky Strike package 
could be the spark American Tobacco needed to jumpstart stagnant sales. 
Over the decades, ATC officials and advertising men had cited Lucky Strike’s 
package design as an impediment to sales. The package’s jade green color clashed 
with women’s clothing and male smokers thought it looked old fashioned compared 
to other brands.
251
 Equally offensive to all potential consumers was the slight smell 
that the green ink gave off.  In the early 1930s, Edward Bernays was one of the more 
vocal critics of the design, and suggested that the Lucky package be changed to a 
neutral color like white. Hill had been involved in the original Lucky Strike package 
design back in 1916, and had always resisted any changes to it. “That’s lousy advice” 
he told Bernays, “I’ve spent millions of dollars advertising the package. Now you ask 
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me to change it[?]”
252
 If the color was going to be changed, Hill required a more 
compelling reason than aesthetics alone. 
 In Spring 1940, in the closing months of the New York World’s Fair, Hill met 
with industrial designer Raymond Loewy to explore possible modifications to the 
Lucky Strike package. Loewy was well known for his streamlined redesigns of many 
products, from refrigerators to locomotives, and most recently for his official work 
designing buildings and exhibits at the World’s Fair. He insisted that clean and simple 
designs made a product functionally and aesthetically appealing. “Between two 
products equal in quality, price, and function,” he explained, “the one that is 
aesthetically correct is the one that sells.”
253
 Though Hill never admitted that the 
Lucky Strike package was unappealing in any way, he still found himself in Loewy’s 
office after hearing a rumor that the industrial designer did not like the current design. 
“My friend Albert Lasker tells me that you ‘think’… you could design a better one” 
he quickly said after introducing himself, “I don’t believe it. Besides, there is nothing 
wrong with the package.” Understanding that Hill was still apprehensive about 
changing an icon that he had invested in so heavily, Loewy instead responded by 
betting the president $50,000 that he could improve on the cigarette package. Hill 
considered this challenge to be reasonable and left Loewy to his work.
254
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 One month later, Loewy finished his redesign and called Hill over to inspect 
the new Lucky Strike package. The new version was familiar looking yet displayed 
the Lucky Strike brand in important new ways. The manufacturing information was 
moved from the back and onto the sides. The trademark red target symbol that 
originally had only graced the front side was put on both the front and back. This 
rearrangement “liberated” the back of the package from technical information 
consumers were not interested in, and created a new space where the brand could be 
easily identified. Regardless of which side a package was laying on, it would now 
display the recognizable Lucky Strike name, literally doubling the advertising impact 
it had. The text on the package remained unchanged in the new design, though the 
font and size was altered slightly to give the package the “machine aesthetic” look 
that Loewy favored. Hill approved these two adjustments readily, but it was Loewy’s 
final suggestion- changing the color from green to white- that he bristled at. “A 
change in appearance of an accepted product thoroughly identifiable by the public is a 
risky thing,” Loewy admitted, “it must not destroy the identity of the package 
established at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.”
255
 Nevertheless, Hill 
relented and agreed that the package color could be changed, on the condition that the 
modifications take place gradually and not all at once. Progressive change would save 
Lucky Strike’s identity for loyal customers and attract new smokers to adopt the 
brand as well.
256
 However, Hill never specified when the changes would occur. He 
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wanted an exciting advertising campaign to explain the bold new look of Lucky 
Strike. Two years later in 1942, the package was still green. Hill implemented all of 
Loewy’s design changes, but was still holding back on changing the color. He was 
still waiting for the perfect campaign to introduce Lucky Strike white. Fortunately for 
American Tobacco, World War II was about to provide just the opportunity. 
 Shortly after the United States entered the war, supply shortages threatened to 
cripple American manufacturers just as much as they impaired the daily lives of 
consumers. While the loss of raw materials only created challenges for most 
businesses, the ATC instead turned a potential crisis into an advertising success that 
observers would later claim was one of the most successful campaigns of the entire 
war. According to company lore, the campaign began in 1942 when the War 
Resources Board put copper powder and chromium on its list of critical materials to 
the war effort. Without these, the ATC would be unable to make gold or green ink. 
Since the Lucky Strike package still had gold panels and a solid green background, 
the loss of these materials spelled certain doom for the iconic packaging. After a few 
months, company reserves of ink quickly dwindled and the head of Purchasing, 
Richard Boylan, was called up to the New York headquarters at 111 Fifth Avenue. 
When he arrived in Hill’s office, he placed a folder with substitute labels at his desk. 
“Is this the best you can do?” Hill asked, disappointed that none of his green options 
were vibrant enough. But there was nothing to be done Boylan shrugged, “just like 
the soldiers, green ink has gone to war.”
257
 As the story goes, Hill immediately 
slammed his hand on his desk, sensing the potential in such a comparison. By 
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wrapping color and design changes to the package up in the rhetoric of war and 
patriotic sacrifice, Lucky Strike could change its appearance without harming its 
image. Finally, George Hill was comfortable implementing the color changes that 
Raymond Loewy had proposed two years earlier.  
Almost overnight, the Lucky Strike package was changed from its old jade 
green color to a cleaner and brighter white. Instead of attributing the change to 
industrial design or other commercial reasons, American Tobacco announced the 
alteration with the slogan “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War.” The phrase was 
first mentioned on Lucky Strike’s radio show Information Please in November 1942 
in a series of teaser announcements that repeated the seven words without explanation 
throughout the broadcast.
258
 After public curiosity was piqued, the change was finally 
explained on Lucky Strike radio programs and in cigarette carton inserts. Just as 
American boys were donning military uniforms and marching to war, ads told 




With their new war slogan, American Tobacco implied that the green ink used 
in their old packaging had been given up for the war effort, presumably for 
camouflage paint or dye for military clothing.
260
 By giving up green ink, industrial 
patriotism and consumer sacrifice were connected in a way that helped Americans 
stay loyal to the Lucky Strike brand despite shortages. Just like American soldiers 
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would return home triumphantly after the war, Lucky Strike would be back one day 
too. In the meantime, with a less costly package design, the slogan offered consumers 
a way to personally support the war when they could choose Lucky Strike. If a 
smoker really wanted to “do their part,” there was no better option than Lucky Strike.  
Throughout the war, it was common to see advertising that made American 
businesses out to be patriotic heroes. All of the major cigarette brands used war copy 
to advertise. But Camel and Chesterfield advertising only used war themes to portray 
their respective brands as the favorite of American troops, leaving the civilian 
consumer out of the picture.
261
 Lucky Strike was the only cigarette that claimed to do 
more than just provide enjoyment for the boys overseas, it was actually helping them 
win the war by sacrificing its green ink.
262
 
The “Lucky Strike Green” slogan was immediately attacked by the advertising 
industry as dishonest and self-promoting. “How Lucky Strike green has gone to 
war…we cannot possibly understand,” blasted the National Association of Ink 
Makers days after the color change, “there always has been and there still is, enough 
of the green in the bins of printing ink manufacturers and enough raw material to 
manufacture it, to supply the deep green formerly used on the Lucky Strike 
package.”
263
 Besides the validity of the claim, Lucky Strike was also criticized for 
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making such an act out to be a great patriotic sacrifice. It was wrong for American 
Tobacco to use war themes to make a profit when there were soldiers and civilians 
making real sacrifices for the war. One advertiser satirically wrote that “as soon as a 
pea canner runs out of peas he shouts ‘canned peas have gone to war!’” and that “as 
soon as an umbrella maker starts building parachutes he has us in Berlin.”
264
 But as 
much as Lucky Strike’s new campaign was deplored by advertisers and other 
manufacturers, it stood out among many war ads that saturated American society. 
“Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War’s” powerful message hit even closer to home 
for many Americans a few weeks after its release when the United States invaded 
North Africa. A happy coincidence for the ATC, sales of Luckies immediately 
increased and would extend as the war continued.
265
 
 Before World War II, George Hill had stubbornly kept the Lucky Strike 
package green, despite objections from advertising, public relations, and industrial 
design experts. Despite a number of practical and convincing arguments, Hill’s 
personal preference for green took precedence. However, the war seemed to change 
all that in an instant. The promise of an advantageous change in Lucky Strike’s 
appearance without the risk of sacrificing years of previous advertising was too great 
and overrode Hill’s hesitations.  
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 Perhaps because of Hill’s reluctance to change the color of the Lucky Strike 
package, it was not advertised uniformly across different advertising mediums. The 
“Lucky Strike Green has Gone to War” slogan was used extensively on the radio and 
matched with the increasingly war-conscious programs Lucky Strike sponsored. Print 
advertising was another matter. Aside from paper inserts in Lucky Strike cartons and 
store displays, the ATC did not print any new ads with the war slogan or any 
explanation for the color change at all. Newspaper and magazine ads featuring 
tobacco workers continued to run without any interruptions or references to the war 
themes present in radio. The ATC would never have kept certain themes in some ads 
not others before the war when intertextualized ad campaigns dominated their 
advertising strategy but as American involvement in the war intensified, Lucky Strike 
radio ads became increasingly politicized and thematically separate from print.
266
 
In late 1942, George Hill received a surprise visit from Kay Kyser in his New 
York office. Hill had made Lucky Strike the exclusive sponsor of Kay Kyser’s 
Kollege of Musical Knowledge in 1939 and was now insisting every broadcast include 
the “Lucky Strike Green has Gone to War” slogan. Kyser felt that the slogan gave the 
ATC more credit for supporting the war effort than it deserved and requested that Hill 
take it off the air. Despite his pleas, he could not put a dent in Hill. Holding up a 
newspaper article covering the recent surge in Lucky Strike sales, Hill believed that 
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war advertising centered on sacrifice and service to the nation worked, regardless of 
how honest it actually was. Kyser left that day unable to remove the slogan. He 
returned several months later, but this time with a different proposal for the ATC.  
Kyser was very patriotic and wanted to make a genuine impact on the war, 
something more real than the green ink the ATC claimed was going to war. Instead of 
broadcasting The Kollege of Musical Knowledge from the NBC studios in Los 
Angeles, Kyser asked if the next show could be aired from a Marine Base in San 
Diego. He thought that having live entertainment for the troops would help improve 
morale at the base. Although recording a show at the base would cost American 
Tobacco an extra six thousand dollars, Hill readily approved the request; he saw yet 
another opportunity to leverage the war to advertise Lucky Strike.
267
 Kyser’s band 
was met by a crowd of cheering Marines, who filled the camp auditorium to capacity 
for the show. The military was so impressed with the turnout that they immediately 
asked if every Kyser show could be broadcast from an Army, Navy, or Marine base. 
“Probably no other show people could have carried off this sort of stunt with quite the 
genuine, good-fellow touch of Kay,” one attendee wrote afterwards.
268
 Pleased with 
the results, American Tobacco was more than happy to let Kyser continue. 
Kyser was the first of many radio stars who took their shows to military bases 
and other service camps around the country. After hearing the broadcast of The 
Kollege of Musical Knowledge, Bob Hope’s producer suggested that the comedian 
take his act to the troops as well. By 1943, hundreds of stars were performing for the 
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troops on the home front and overseas on the front lines. The service that these men 
and women provided was sincerely done in the name of winning the war, but it was 
no secret in the industry that doing this “patriotic duty” also had commercial benefits 
as well. Broadcasts from service facilities gave performers a higher profile, increased 
ratings of their shows, and tied the sponsor to the war effort in a positive way.
269
 
After the San Diego show, Hill allowed Kyser to perform exclusively at military 
camps from then on. At the war’s end Kyser had performed in over three hundred 
camps well over one thousand times, far more than anyone else in the country. “I 
intend to go on doing everything I can,” Kyser said of his camp performances, “to 
entertain the boys in service and help the war effort.” The bandleader’s genuine 
patriotism was the perfect foil to the “Lucky Strike Green” slogan and its profit 
motive. Observing similar celebrity performances later in the war, sociologist Robert 
Merton noted that the majority of listeners honestly believed in the performer’s 
sincere desire to aid the war effort. That listeners reacted in this way to Kyser and 
other stars was surprising he noted, given “the disenchantment of our informants with 
the world of advertising, commercials and propaganda.”
270
 
Lucky Strike continued to sponsor The Kollege of Musical Knowledge until 
late 1944, when George Hill decided to pick up The Jack Benny Program instead. 
Jack Benny was the most popular comedian of his day and his show was significantly 
more popular than Kyser’s.
271
 Benny was known for appearing at the Hollywood 
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Canteen, the servicemen’s entertainment club run by celebrities, and broadcast his 
show there multiple times.
272
 Though commercials had been integrated into the other 
shows sponsored by Lucky Strike in the past, Benny incorporated them into his 
comedic routine. Poking fun at other Lucky Strike radio programs, Lucky Strike 
cigarettes, and even George Hill himself, Benny made the advertisement a substantial 
part of the show. This helped keep the audience’s attention on Lucky Strike for the 
entire broadcast.
273
 Shortly after signing with Lucky Strike, Benny assured Hill that 
he would use his show to sell Luckies using associations with the war effort, 
integrated commercials, and the rest of his best tricks. Hill replied that he had picked 
up the show for that very reason: “Boy, I am a salesman enough to know that it’s the 
year’s record that counts…But I don’t have to wait this time for the year’s record...to 
convince me that you are going to sell the goods.”
274
    
 Lucky Strike radio advertising depicted the war as a serious conflict that 
required the sacrifice and support of industry and civilian alike; it was a war in which 
ordinary Americans were intimately involved. Kyser made a point of performing for 
enlisted men and not officers, and liked to eat with the men in mess halls and talk 
with them before shows.  One of his favorite stories to tell soldiers was about a 
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general in one camp who issued an order that no officers were to attend the Kollege of 
Musical Knowledge. Any officer caught doing so would be immediately demoted and 
serve with the regular troops.
275
 Kyser made sure that the listening audience back 
home also knew he was performing for regular Americans and not for any other 
group of listeners. Members of the audience were frequently called on stage to answer 
questions written in by fans across the country. Questions were typically about songs, 
actors, films, and other popular culture topics familiar to a national listening 
audience.
276
 In a letter to George Hill, one listener exclaimed that when Kyser 
incorporated popular culture and war themes in the same program, “you bring me 
right into your program.”
277
 When Lucky Strike radio advertising was broadcast into 
the living rooms of America, it also brought reminders of the war and its impact on 
ordinary Americans. If the ATC followed the same advertising strategies as it did a 
decade earlier, then all Lucky Strike ads should have also contained “realistic” war 
imagery. However, American Tobacco put a radically different kind of message in 
their printed advertising. It seemed that the ATC’s ideas about Lucky Strike and a 
unified consumer audience were beginning to change.  
 If Americans had only looked at print advertisements for Lucky Strike in the 
1940s, they would scarcely been able to tell there was a war going on. In newspapers 
and magazines, the only acknowledgement of conflict was a small logo for war bonds 
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on the corner of the page. Instead, these ads revolved around idealized versions of 
rural tobacco country. The ATC commissioned Thomas Hart Benton and others from 
the Associated American Artists to paint romantic scenes of farmers out in fields 
filled with tobacco, or auctioneers in warehouses bursting at the seams with large 
tobacco leaves. Labeling these farmers and auctioneers as experts, each advertisement 
used their authority to claim that Lucky Strike cigarettes were made from the finest 
tobacco the ATC could acquire. Hill would say “I know the great preference for 
Lucky Strike is a fact…‘two-to-one’ is one of the great, confident expressions in our 
language. It is rarely argued with.”
278
 Before long, newspapers and magazines began 
displaying paintings of farmers along with Hill’s new slogan: “With men who know 
tobacco best, it’s Luckies two to one.” 
 Later in 1942, Hill developed what was to be his last great slogan of his 
career. Repeating the theme of quality ingredients in every cigarette, the new phrase 
short and simple: “Lucky Strike Means Fine Tobacco.” In 1943, the words were 
paired with a painting of a white overalled farmer in his field holding a big golden 
tobacco leaf. That year the Advertising Research Foundation named the ad to be one 
of the most memorable of year.
279
  By 1944, the slogan had become so familiar to 
Americans that it was shortened to “L.S. /M.F.T.,” and was printed on the bottom of 
every package of cigarettes.   
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 The artwork that was used in the “tobacco expert” advertisements was 
engineered by George Hill and others at American Tobacco to create an idyllic view 
of the tobacco industry and consumer access to cigarettes during wartime. “We don’t 
want realism that will foul up our sales,” one of Hill’s assistants maintained and 
portraying racial diversity or the realities of cigarette manufacturing and availability 
of consumer goods in wartime was unacceptable.
280
  
In his memoirs, Thomas Hart Benton remembered the frustration he felt as the 
ATC manipulated his artwork from a realistic depiction of black tobacco farmers into 
an image that excluded non-whites and would be unrecognizable anywhere in the 
United States. After being commissioned by the ATC to paint a “realistic picture of 
the tobacco industry,” Benton traveled to southern Georgia where be filled a book 
with sketches of farmers out in their fields cultivating and harvesting leaves. 
Confident that his patrons would be pleased, he returned to Hill’s office where he was 
shocked to learn that he did not have a single sketch the ATC approved. “You ought 
to know,” he was told by ad men “that you cannot picture Negroes doing what looks 
like old-time slave work when you are advertising tobacco.” Benton stood 
dumbfounded as they continued: “The Negro institutions would boycott our 
products…if we showed pictures of this sort.” And if Lucky Strike ads contained 
well-dressed, respectable looking blacks, “of course, the whole of the white South 
would boycott us. So the only thing to do is to avoid the representation of Negroes 
entirely.” 
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Still bewildered but determined to please American Tobacco, Benton traveled 
to North Carolina, where tobacco was handled mostly by white workers. Here, he 
thought, he could paint a picture of tobacco that was both realistic and acceptable to 
advertisers. The artist found an old farmer out in the hill country and sketched him 
and his granddaughter sorting tobacco leaves. Upon returning to New York City for 
the second time, he learned that this picture too was unacceptable. The granddaughter 
was not pretty enough for a Lucky Strike ad. Chalking the disapproval up to his own 
artistic style, Benton used a friend’s daughter as a model and quickly drafted up a 
new picture. Yet again, he was dismayed to hear while Hill liked the work personally; 
it was not suitable for public display. The girl appeared too thin, and Benton was 
informed that this might suggest that “proximity to tobacco caused consumption.” 
“Everything about tobacco must look healthy,” Hill insisted. After taking the girl out 
entirely, Benton was rejected again because the tobacco leaves were not large or 
yellow enough. This did not match the “fine tobacco” slogan that would be in the 
advertisements. Benton eventually did finish his painting, “The Curing Barn,” in a 
way that met with ATC approval, but it hardly resembled any of the locations he 
actually visited in tobacco country.
281
 
Benton’s experience with American Tobacco was not unique. Similar efforts 
to create “realistic” portrayals of cigarette manufacture at the 1939 New York 
World’s Fair had also resulted in a vision of American society that completely 
ignored racial and ethnic diversity. Like the all-white cast of smiling workers in the 
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Lucky Strike Fair Exhibit, Benton and other artists were forced to omit people of 
color in order to depict a happy and racially-harmonious society.
282
 
All of the paintings created for American Tobacco by Benton and his 
colleagues were deliberately rooted in a “folkish vision of preindustrial 
abundance.”
283
 This trend, according Jackson Lears, emerged in the 1930s as 
advertisers sought to bolster consumer morale among white Americans. Reassuring 
iconography of the “traditional” American way of life that harkened back to a largely 
legendary time when there were no shortages of goods or tough sacrifices to be made 
for the war effort. In their attempts to comfort consumers with images of harmony 
and plenty, American Tobacco ignored racial diversity, labor unrest, consumer 
shortages, and other disruptions that were omnipresent in the war era. Though more 
Lucky Strikes were being made and sold than ever before, ordinary American 
consumers did not have access to them as the plentiful farms in the ads promised. 
Unlike the Lucky Strike radio programs from this era, print advertisements did not 
reflect any of the realities of war on the home front that millions of Americans 
actually encountered.  
 
 Of all the impacts that World War II had upon the American Tobacco 
Company, the rift in advertising policies was among the most visible. Campaigns on 
the radio that were carried out by Kay Kyser, Jack Benny, and other performers did as 
much supporting the troops as they did Lucky Strike. They recognized that the war 
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was having a dramatic impact on ordinary people, and made that clear to listeners 
time and time again. Just as war bond drives were more than simple means for 
financing the war, the “Lucky Strike Green” campaign and shows broadcast from 
service camps served as constant reminders that the war was a very real thing despite 
being a world away.
284
 Alternately, Lucky Strike print advertisements hardly admitted 
that any conflict existed and did not acknowledge its effect on Americans in any 
realistic manner.
285
 Working with entertainers, artists, designers, and many other 
advertising men, George Hill allowed different Lucky Strike campaigns to depict 
American society and life in radically different ways, and by extension, target 
separate groups of consumers.  
 
 As war disrupted the lives of businesses and consumers alike, American 
Tobacco realized that the mass audience they had taken for granted had never actually 
existed at all. Before World War II Lucky Strike advertising was based on the idea 
that there was an interclass audience in the United States, and that the best way to 
persuade them to buy products was with unified advertising messages. Though this 
assumption was abandoned by the middle of World War II, it did not prevent the 
ATC from successfully selling billions of cigarettes in the 1920s and 1930s.  During 
the war, however, American Tobacco decided to focus radio advertising on the war 
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 According to Robert Sobel, if a viewer really looked into an ad, L.S./M.F.T sounded like a 
military Morse code signal and the phrase “So Round, So Firm, So Fully Packed. So Free and Easy on 
the Draw” used to describe the cigarette “had vague sexual connotations geared at drawing nudges 
from the sailors and soldiers, with implications that a Lucky might do when women were not 
available.” Sobel, 132.  
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and the sacrifices it required, and print advertising on themes of overflowing 
abundance and omissions of diversity. Using dissimilar themes to advertise Lucky 
Strike would never have happened a decade before. Yet domestic sales of Lucky 
Strikes continued to skyrocket despite pervasive wartime shortages. It was in this 
moment that the company realized that society was made up of diverse audiences that 
responded positively to diversified advertising campaigns. 
 The ATC was not alone in uncovering the myth of the “one, big audience.” In 
1943 sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton empirically demonstrated that 
film, radio, and reading audiences had always been made up of dissimilar groups. 
Social and cultural divisions in American society would cause viewers (and 
consumers) to view a message in different ways. The same idea applied to Lucky 
Strike customers. “The writer,” they observed, “must address his propaganda to a 
psychologically heterogeneous audience, i.e. the members of which are in different 
states of mind on the given issue. Materials which are effective for one segment of the 
audience may produce opposite effects among another.”
286
 Americans were as diverse 
as Earl Robinson’s 1939 “Ballad for Americans” had suggested and American 
Tobacco was seeing the benefits that came with this new vision of consumer society. 
 During World War II many observers adopted the diverse society concept that 
Lazarsfeld and Merton had “discovered” in 1943.
287
 In 1946 Lazarsfeld wrote that 
“the radio industry has become aware of how widely varied is the composition of 
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listeners for different programs.”
288
 The Hollywood community experienced similar 
doubts about an interclass audience in the last years of the war.
289
 People who heard 
and saw Lucky Strike advertising were the same. While one viewer may have found 
the idealized rural scenes of tobacco farmers reassuring and positive, others may have 
rejected these advertisements because they could not relate. Radio ads, which 
recognized the war and its considerable impact on ordinary Americans, were more 
appealing to consumers like Bill Storr, who connected the “Lucky Strike Green has 
Gone to War” theme with his own personal war experiences for the rest of his life. 
 When all was said and done at the end of World War II, the fragmentation and 
collapse of unity within Lucky Strike advertising was not a negative change for the 
American Tobacco Company. Instead of creating disunity that alienated smokers and 
harmed sales, this shift in advertising diversified its appeal among heterogeneous 
audiences. The war freed the ATC from their belief in a “great mass audience” that 
caused campaigns to ignore minorities other groups, which made up a significant 
portion of American society. By beginning to recognize diversity among consumer 
groups, the ATC was able to maintain consumer loyalty to the brand and attract new 
smokers too.  
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When World War II began the American Tobacco Company had been quick 
to send Lucky Strike away to war. Americans were left with empty shelves and 
reminders on the radio that their cigarettes were overseas helping soldiers protect the 
American way of life. When the war ended, consumers suddenly were able to buy as 
many Luckies as they wanted again. After enduring shortages and rations for more 
years than they cared to remember, Lucky Strike’s return must have been a welcome 
sight to many. But part of the brand remained at war too. As part of the Marshall 
Plan, millions of Lucky Strikes and other cigarettes were sent to Europe to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
aid in reconstruction of the ravaged continent. In the months after the war, cigarettes 
became legitimate currency in most of Europe. Soldiers and civilians alike could use 
their Luckies to buy anything from a room for the night to cameras and other 
expensive items.
290
 Other wartime changes ultimately became permanent; Lucky 
Strike’s new white label was the most obvious example. Lucky Strike Green had gone 
to war never to return. Some returning veterans grumbled when they could not find 




The changes that Lucky Strike advertising strategy underwent during the war 
also remained after 1945, and continued to transform after George Hill’s death the 
following year. The man who had pioneered so many new advertising techniques in 
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his fanatical quest to sell Lucky Strikes was felled by a heart attack at the age of 61, 
likely caused by his habit of smoking four packs of Luckies a day. Though Hill was 
alive during the war to see the first signs of change in ATC advertising, he would 
hardly have believed what was to come in the next decade. By 1948, it seemed that 
many of Hill’s former employees could not either. American Tobacco eliminated 
claims that Lucky Strike has fewer irritants than rival brands, which Hill had 
introduced to ads in 1927. In protest, Foote, Cone, & Belding (Lord & Thomas 
changed its name after Albert Lasker retired from the agency) resigned the Lucky 
Strike advertising account as did Hill’s own son George Hill Jr., a vice-president of 
advertising.
292
 By the end of the decade the company’s advertising department 
scarcely resembled its former self. As American Tobacco fought to stay atop the 
cigarette industry, newly empowered advertising executives also continued to move 
away from the “single mass-audience” model of advertising that they had pursued 
before the war, and towards a more inclusive strategy that recognized consumer 
diversity.  
In May 1948, the popular African-American magazine Ebony published an 
article on a new type of advertiser that had arisen in the mid-1940s: the “brown 
huckster.” As corporations began to look for new consumer groups to make up for 
markets lost in war-ravaged Europe, they “heard the jingle of coin among the nation’s 
newest selling frontier- the undeveloped market of 14 million Negroes with pockets 
full of boomtime wages.”
293
 During and after the war, the movement of blacks out of 
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the isolated South and into better jobs in urban areas was also attracting the attention 
of advertisers. Black America, a consumer group that American Tobacco’s 
advertising had long ignored and excluded from its vision of modernity, was no 
longer seen as peripheral or irrelevant.
294
 By early 1948 Camel, Chesterfield, and 
many other cigarette brands were hiring black hucksters (salesmen) and advertising in 
the black press. “Virtually every major cigarette, except Lucky Strike, has run copy in 
negro newspapers,” Ebony continued, challenging American Tobacco to reach out to 
their black consumers.
295
 Phillip Morris was the first cigarette brand to advertise in 
Ebony at the start of the decade, and by 1948 Lucky Strike was the only brand that 
had not followed their example.
296
 Later that year, Lucky Strike responded with new 
ads in Ebony, the first of many ATC ad campaigns to directly target black consumers. 
The first advertisement the ATC published in Ebony read “First in Negro 
History…First in Cigarette History.” Juxtaposing an image of Booker T. Washington 
with the claim that more men in the tobacco industry smoked Lucky Strike than any 
other brand, the ATC made it clear that African Americans could be a part of modern 
American society as long as they smoked Luckies.
297
 More ads in the series soon 
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1915, and thought that it contributed to moral corruption and idleness. 
followed featuring scientist George Washington Carver, athlete Jesse Owens, and 
other “modern Negro notables.” The “Famous Firsts” series was “designed to show 
the Negro that his race has accomplished many things” and used many of the same 
advertising strategies that Hill had used in the late 1920s and early 1930s to entice 
new smokers.
298
 Like the “Precious Voice” campaign of 1927, there were appeals to 
scientific and celebrity authority. “Famous Firsts” also associated Lucky Strike with 
African Americans who were labeled as members of modern society similar to other 
campaigns from the previous decade. For months, these ads were run exclusively in 
national and local African American newspapers and magazines.
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The following year, new ads ran in Ebony with African Americans making 
Lucky Strike a part of their youthful, active lives. Smiling African Americans playing 
golf and tennis or tobogganing through the snow invited readers to join them in the 
healthy lifestyles that modern American society enjoyed. The inclusion of leisure 
activities in these ads shows how American Tobacco was finally recognizing that 
African Americans had ample discretionary income and trying to attract their 
consumer dollars.
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 That same year, other Lucky Strike ads were published in 
national magazines focused more on female smoking than on race or leisure 
activities. White women appeared smoking Luckies and were framed by colorful 
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 “When advertising and sales are coordinated, you get results.” Printer’s Ink, November 26, 
1948, 68. 
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 Before 1940, most white advertisers virtually ignored African American consumers unless 
they were selling skin whiteners, hair straighters, or other cosmetic products. When advertisers did 
advertise in African American newspapers, they often used ads that featured whites and refused to 





 There were few similarities between ad campaigns targeting white 
smokers and those targeting black smokers other than the image of the Lucky Strike 
package and the ever-present “L.S.M.F.T.” slogan.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, American Tobacco continued to tailor part of their 
advertising to the African American market. Lucky Strike ads were similar to other 
cigarette brands and often published endorsements from African American celebrities 
and role models in Ebony, particularly athletes. Testimonials from Jesse Owens, Roy 
Campenella, and 1952 Rookie of the Year Joe Black were common in periodicals that 
had a wide African American readership. Lucky Strike ads in Life and other 
magazines with more white readers, on the other hand, used athlete endorsements 
much less frequently in the post war years.
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 Although Lucky Strike was never 
known as an African American cigarette, it remained the second most popular brand 
behind Camel throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
303
  
Like many of the other advertising strategies that American Tobacco adopted 
during the George Hill years, targeting African Americans with tailored 
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 By the late 1950s, there were five times as many athlete endorsements in cigarette ads in 
Ebony than there were in Life. Richard W. Pollay, Jung S. Lee, and David Carter-Whitney, "Separate, 
but Not Equal: Racial Segmentation in Cigarette Advertising." Journal of Advertising 21, no. 1 (March 
1992): 51. Also see Valerie B. Yerger, and R. E. Malone’s "African American Leadership Groups: 
Smoking with the Enemy." 
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 A 1953 survey of cigarette brands described Lucky Strike’s marketing profile as 
“proportionately greater strength among men, younger smokers, middle and lower classes, students 
and smokers in the southern part of the country. By size of market, the pattern is fairly uniform with 
the exception of large metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 population and over. The brand is relatively 
weak here” In comparison, the Camel and Phillip Morris brand descriptions specifically listed 
“negroes” as a significant part of their profiles. The report also noted that 36% of African American 
smokers preferred Camel while 16% preferred Lucky Strike. “National Consumer Study of Cigarette 
Smoking Habits, Summer 1953 by Sullivan, Stauffer, Colwell & Bayles, Inc.,” Legacy Tobacco 
Documents Library. 1953. 25-26, 44. 
advertisements was a decision motivated by profit. In Desegregating the Dollar, 
historian Robert Weems Jr. has argued that increased post-war incomes and the rise 
of professional advocates for African American access to goods drastically 
transformed their status as consumers. Instead of reducing African Americans to 
stereotypes or omitting them completely from advertising, economic pressure forced 
corporations to concede to African American consumer needs. The ATC’s 1948 and 
1949 advertisements in Ebony recognized these changes and were an attempt to 
compete with rival brands that had been quicker to target African Americans.
304
  
 Although Hill was not at the helm of the ATC in the 1950s, his legacy still 
remained in Lucky Strike advertising. His last great slogan: “Lucky Strike Means 
Fine Tobacco” was printed on every pack of cigarettes for years after his death and is 
still the brand’s slogan today. ATC advertising continued to spread out and explore 
new mediums in order to reach more potential consumers. Hill’s greatest radio 
program, Your Hit Parade, remained popular with viewers and transitioned to 
television until the show was taken off the air in 1959. As medical research and 
investigations began to reveal the health risks associated with smoking to the public, 
American Tobacco was among tobacco’s greatest defenders. George Hill would have 
approved of the company’s decision to publish “A Frank Statement to Cigarette 
Smokers,” a 1954 advertisement that used the testimonial of medical authorities to 
dispute reports that smoking caused cancer and other terminal diseases. And though 
he never approved any ads with positive depictions of African Americans during his 
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 Chesterfield and Camel entered the African American market in the mid 1940s, years 
before Lucky Strike. 
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lifetime, Hill would have agreed that a strategy that increased the number of potential 
customers was always good for Lucky Strike. 
The post-Hill years continued to move the ATC away from a dogmatic belief 
in a unified audience. This was due in large part to the improved economic standing 
and visibility of different consumer groups. In the mid 1940s African Americans 
spent over ten billion dollars on consumer goods, over three times as much as they 
had twenty years earlier. Over one hundred million of those dollars were being spent 
on cigarettes.
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 It was difficult for American Tobacco not to notice the profits to be 
made from the consumers their advertising had ignored for so long. But the decision 
to advertise to African Americans was also made possible by the company’s changing 
ideas about American society. Lucky Strike’s sales success during World War II had 
proven that advertising could undergo sweeping changes and still maintain brand 
loyalty and the disintegration of the unified mass audience concept during the war 
opened the door for the ATC’s African American campaigns in the following years. 
George Hill may not have believed in racial equality or a consumer’s right to see 
themselves reflected in advertising, but he did believe in using advertising to sell as 
many Lucky Strikes as possible. And introducing the appearance of diversity in 
advertising did just that. 
Looking back, Lucky Strike advertising was part of the wider American 
cultural context between the late 1920s and the 1950s. The changes that Lucky Strike 
advertising went through during the Hill presidency were consistent with other 
cultural industries in the United States. American Tobacco assumed there was one 
“great big audience” like the film and radio industries did in the prewar era. And 
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 Weems, 34. 
during World War II, Lucky Strike ads began to recognize diversity in consumer 
groups at the same time that films and radio programs did. Lucky Strike followed 
popular cultural trends closely in the post-war era as well; it discovered Ebony 
magazine at the same time that Hollywood discovered Sidney Poitier and began 
giving him serious acting roles. At its core, Lucky Strike advertising was strictly 
commercial; George Hill would not stand for anything less. But it is also in sync with 
what historians know about popular culture in this period and should be understood as 
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Graph taken from Lum, K. L., J. R. Polansky, R. K. Jackler, and S. A. Glantz. "Signed, Sealed and 
Delivered: "Big Tobacco" in Hollywood, 1927-1951." Tobacco Control 17, no. 5 (October 2008): 313-
23. 
 
Figure 3. Hollywood Endorsements in Advertising by Brand, 1927-
1951 
Ratings data taken from Summers, Harrison B. A Thirty-Year History of Programs Carried on National Radio Networks in 






Edward L. Bernays Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.  
Tobacco Documents Online, http://tobaccodocuments.org 
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, University of California, San Francisco, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu 
New York World’s Fair 1939 and 1940 Incorporated Records, Manuscripts and 
Archives Division, New York Public Library. 
Stanford Research Into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising, Stanford School of 
Medicine, http://tobacco.stanford.edu 
Tobacco Workers International Union Archives, State of Maryland and Historical 
Collections, University of Maryland, College Park. 
 
Journals and Magazines: 
Advertising Age 








Saturday Evening Post 
 
Primary Published Sources: 
American Tobacco Company, Lucky Strike Advertising. U.S.A.: The American 
Tobacco Company, 1938. 
— Radio: A Modern Advertising Force, 1938. 
— Sales Organization, 1938. 
—"Sold American!"- The First Fifty Years. 1954. 
—The American Tobacco Company and Its Service to the Public: Some Interesting 
Facts About an American Business. 1940. 
Arnheim, Rudolph. Radio: An Art of Sound. New York: Da Capo Press, 1972. 
Bernays, Edward L. Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel 
Edward L. Bernays. New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1965. 
— "The Engineering of Consent." Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 250 (March 1947): 113-20. 
—Propaganda. New York: Horace Liveright, 1928. 
Benton, Thomas Hart. An Artist in America. 3rd ed. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1968. 
Borden, Neil H. The Economic Effects of Advertising. Chicago: Richard Irwin, Inc., 
1947. 
Brown, George F. “Phillip Morris’ Human Relations Program Sets Pace for 
Industry.” Pittsburgh Courier Magazine Section, October 17, 1953. 
Calkins, Earnest E. "And Hearing Not-" Annals of an Adman. New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1985. 
Cantril, Hadley. The Psychology of Radio. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1935. 
Cone, Fairfax M. With All Its Faults: A Candid Account of Forty Years in 
Advertising. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969. 
Dunlap Jr., Orrin E. Radio In Advertising. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1931 
Flannagan, Roy G. The Story of Lucky Strike. [World’s Fair Edition], The American 
Tobacco Company, 1939. 
Fredrick, J. George. Masters of Advertising Copy: Principles and Practice of Copy 
Writers According to its Leading Practitioners. 1925. Reprint, New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1985. 
Husband, Richard W. and Jane Godfrey. "An Experimental Study of Cigarette 
Identification." Journal of Applied Psychology 18, no. 2 (April 1934): 220-23. 
Kyle, Jeannette. "Whither Goest Thou, Modern Youth?" The English Journal 21, no. 
8 (October 1932): 646. 
 149 
 
Lazarsfeld, Paul. The People Look at Radio. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1946. 
Lazarsfeld, Paul, and Robert Merton. "Studies in Radio and Film 
Propaganda." Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences 6, no. 2 
(December 1943): 58-75. 
Leib, Clarence W. East, Drink and Be Slender: What Every Overweight Person 
Should Know and Do. New York: John Day Company, 1929. 
Loewy, Raymond. Never Leave Well Enough Alone. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, republished 2002. 
—"Selling Through Design." Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 90, no. 4604 
(January 9, 1942): 92-103. 
New York World's Fair 1939. Official Guide Book of the New York World's Fair 
1939. New York: Exposition Publications, 1939. 
Rubicam, Raymond. "Advertising." In While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime 
Life in the United States, edited by Jack Goodman, 421-46. New York: Simon 
and Schuster Inc., 1946. 
Thorp, Margaret F. America at the Movies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. 
Wagner, Philip. "Cigarettes vs. Candy. War Correspondence from a New Battle 
Front." The New Republic, February 13, 1929, 343-45. 
Wakeman, Fredric. The Hucksters. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1946. 
 
Secondary Published Sources: 
Albert, Michael R., and Kristen G. Ostheimer. "The Evolution of Current Medical 
and Popular Attitudes Toward Ultraviolet Exposure." Journal of the American 
Academy of Dermatology 48, no. 6 (June 2003): 909-918. 
Bartels, Robert. The History of Marketing Thought. 2nd ed. Columbus: Grid 
Publishing, 1976. 
Bauer, Raymond A., and Stephen A. Greyser. Advertising in America: The Consumer 
View. Boston: Harvard Business School, 1968. 
Boorstin, Daniel J. The Americans: The National Experience. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1967. 
Brandt, Allan M. The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of 
the Product that Defined America. New York: Basic Books, 2007. 
Brinkley, Alan. Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, & the Great 
Depression. New York: Vintage Books, 1982. 
Brown, Stephen. "Postmodern Marketing?" European Journal of Marketing 27, no. 4 
(1993): 26. 
Burns, Eric. The Smoke of the Gods: A Social History of Tobacco. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2007. 
Capparell, Stephanie. The Real Pepsi Challenge: The Inspirational Story of Breaking 
the Color Barrier in American Business. New York: Wall Street Journal 
Books, 2007. 
Chambers, Jason. Madison Avenue and the Color Line: African Americans in the 
Advertising Industry. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
Cohen, Lizabeth. Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago: 1919-1939. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Cott, Nancy F. The Grounding of Modern Feminism. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987. 
Cox, Jim. Music Radio: The Great Performers and Programs of the 1920s through 
the Early 1960s. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2005. 
Craig, Douglas B. Fireside Politics: Radio and Culture in the United States, 1920-
1940. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 
Cruikshank, Jeffrey L., and Arthur W. Schultz. The Man Who Sold America: The 
Amazing (but True!) Story of Albert D. Lasker and the Creation of the 
Advertising Century. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2010. 
Diaz, Virgil Samuel. “Advertising in the Cigarette Industry: The George Washington 
Hill Years.” Master’s thesis, Arizona State University, 1975. 
Douglas, Susan J. Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination. New York: 
Times Books, 1999. 
Dumenil, Lynn. The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 
Dyer, Richard. Heavenly Bodies: Film Stars and Society. Hong Kong: MacMillan 
Education, 1986. 
—Stars. London: British Film Institute, 1998. 
Erenberg, Lewis A., and Susan E. Hirsch, eds. The War in American Culture: Society 




Ewen, Stuart. Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of 
Consumer Culture. New York: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, 1976. 
—PR!: A Social History of Spin. New York: Basic Books, 1996. 
Fowles, Jib. Advertising and Popular Culture. London: Sage Publications, 1996. 
Fox, Frank W. Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of 
American Advertising 1941-1945. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University 
Press, 1975. 
Fox, Stephen R. The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its 
Creators. New York: Morrow, 1984. 
Fox, Richard W., and T J. Lears. The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in 
American History, 1880-1980. New York: Pantheon, 1983. 
Frisby, David. "Analyzing Modernity: Some Issues." In Tracing Modernity: 
Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City, edited by Mari 
Hvattum and Christian Hermansen, 3-23. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Gardner, Martha N., and Allan M. Brandt. "The Doctors’ Choice Is America’s 
Choice: The Physician in US Cigarette Advertisements, 1930–
1953." American Journal of Public Health 92, no. 2 (February 2006): 222-32. 
Gately, Iain. Tobacco: A Cultural History of how an Exotic Plant Seduced 
Civilization. New York: Grove Press, 2001. 
Gerstle, Gary. "Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans." The Journal of 
American History 84, no. 2 (September 1997): 524-58. 
Giovacchini, Saverio. Hollywood Modernism: Film and Politics in the Age of the New 
Deal. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001. 
Glantz, Stanton A., John Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer, and Deborah E. 
Barnes. The Cigarette Papers. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1996. 
Gunther, John. Taken at the Flood: The Story of Albert D. Lasker. New York: Harper 
& Brothers Publishers, 1960. 
Hair, Raymond D., and Jürgen Wölfer. Thinking of You: The Story of Kay Kyser. 
Albany, GA: BearManor Media, 2011. 
Heimann, Robert K. Tobacco and Americans. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1960. 
Horton, Gerd. Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda During 
World War II. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. 
Jones, John B. The Songs That Fought the War: Popular Music and the Home Front, 
1939-1945. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2006. 
Kluger, Richard. Ashes to Ashes: America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public 
Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1996. 
Kyvig, David E. Daily Life in the United States, 1920-1940: How Americans Lived 
Through the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression. Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee, 2004. 
Laird, Pamela W. Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of 
Consumer Marketing. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
Lears, Jackson. Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America. 
New York: Basic Books, 1995. 
Lehu, Jean-Marc. Branded Entertainment: Product Placement & Brand Strategy in 
the Entertainment Business. Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2007. 
Levine, Lawrence. The Unpredictable Past: Explorations in American Cultural 
History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Lum, K. L., J. R. Polansky, R. K. Jackler, and S. A. Glantz. "Signed, Sealed and 
Delivered: "Big Tobacco" in Hollywood, 1927-1951." Tobacco Control 17, 
no. 5 (October 2008): 313-23. 
Lynd, Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd. Middletown: A Study in Contemporary 
American Culture. London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1929. 
—Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, & World, Inc., 1937. 
MacDonald, Dwight. Masscult & Midcult. New York: Partisan Review. 1961. 
Marchand, Roland. Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 
1920-1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
McGrath, John M. "IMC at a Crossroads: A Theoretical Review and a Conceptual 
Framework for Testing." Marketing Management Journal 15, no. 2 (2005): 
55-65. 
Merton, Robert K. Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive. 
New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1946. 
Mitchell, Rick. "The Confidence Man: Performing the Magic of 




National Cancer Institute, “The Role of the Media in Promoting and Reducing 
Tobacco Use,” 2008, 
http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/19/m19_complete.pdf 
Newman, Kathy M. Radio Active: Advertising and Consumer Activism, 1935-1947. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 
Parker-Pope, Tara. Cigarettes: Anatomy of an Industry From Seed to Smoke. New 
York: The New Press, 2001. 
Pollay, Richard W., Jung S. Lee, and David Carter-Whitney. "Separate, but Not 
Equal: Racial Segmentation in Cigarette Advertising." Journal of 
Advertising 21, no. 1 (March 1992): 45-57. 
O'Brien, Kenneth P., and Lynn H. Parsons, eds. The Home-Front War: World War II 
and American Society. London: Greenwood Press, 1995. 
O'Neill, William. A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in 
World War II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Robert, Joseph C. The Story of Tobacco in America. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1949. 
Saab, A. Joan. For the Millions: American Art and Culture Between the Wars. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt’s America, 
Mussolini’s Italy, and Hitler’s Germany, 1933-1939. New York: Henry Holt 
& Company, 2007. 
Schudson, Michael. Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious Impact on 
American Society. New York: Basic Books, 1984. 
Schultz, Don E., Stanley I. Tannenbaum, and Robert F. Lauterborn. Integrated 
Marketing Communications. Chicago: NTC Business Books, 1993. 
Schwarzkopf, Stefan. "Turning Trade Marks into Brands: how Advertising Agencies 
Created Brands in the Global Market Place, 1900-1930." CGR Working Paper 
Series, Queen Mary University of London (August 2008). 
Segrave, Kerry. Product Placement in Hollywood Films: A History. Jefferson: 
McFarland & Company, 2004. 
Sklar, Robert. Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies. 2nd ed. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
Snead, James. white screens/black images: Hollywood from the Dark Side. New 
York: Routledge, 1994. 
Sobel, Robert. They Satisfy: The Cigarette in American Life. New York: Anchor 
Books, 1978. 
Spotts, Harlan E., David R. Lambert, and Mary L. Joyce. "Marketing Déjà Vu: The 
Discovery of Integrated Marketing Approach." Journal of Marketing 
Education 20, no. 3 (1998): 210-18. 
Spring, Katherine. Saying It With Songs: Popular Music and the Coming of Sound to 
Hollywood Cinema. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Sterling, Christopher H., and John M. Kittross. Stay Tuned: A History of American 
Broadcasting. 3rd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002. 
Stole, Inger L. Advertising at War: Business, Consumers, and Government in the 
1940s. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2012. 
—Advertising on Trial: Consumer Activism and Corporate Public Relations in the 
1930s. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006. 
Summers, Harrison B. A Thirty-Year History of Programs Carried on National Radio 
Networks in the United States 1926-1956, 20, 25.  New York: Arno Press, 
1971. 
Susman, Warren I. Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in 
the Twentieth Century. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
2003. 
—""Personality" and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture." In New Directions 
in American Intellectual History, edited by John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
—The People's Fair: Cultural Contradictions of American Society in the Twentieth 
Century. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003. 
Tedlow, Richard S. New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America. 
New York: Basic Books, 1990. 
Tennant, Richard B. The American Cigarette Industry: A Study in Economic Analysis 
and Public Policy. London: Yale University Press, 1950. 
Tilley, Nannie M. The R.J. Reynolds Company. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985. 
Watkins, Julian L. The 100 Greatest Advertisements: Who Wrote Them and What 
They Did. 2nd ed. New York: Dover Publications, 1959. 
Weems Jr., Robert E. Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in 
the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
Winfield, Betty H. FDR and the News Media. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1990. 
Yerger, Valerie B., and R. E. Malone. "African American Leadership Groups: 
Smoking with the Enemy." Tobacco 11, no. 4 (2002): 336-45. 
 155 
 
Zim, Larry, Mel Lerner, and Herbert Rolfes. The World of Tomorrow: The 1939 New 
York World's Fair. New York: Main Street Press, 1988. 
